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INTRODUCTION
Until recently, high-level employees' under investigation by the
government were often reimbursed by their employers for the attor-
neys' fees they incurred and the disgorgement and penalties they
agreed to pay. This changed over the last several years as government
2agencies increasingly conditioned settlements with companies on an
agreement that the companies withhold such indemnification. Most
prominently, the Thompson Memorandum required Department of
Justice (DOJ) prosecutors to consider whether a company reimbursed
its employees' attorneys' fees in deciding whether to indict the com-
3pany. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also devel-
oped anti-indemnification policies,4 but it focused on whether com-
panies were indemnifying their employees' penalties.
The term "employees" is used in this discussion to refer to past and present em-
ployees, officers, and directors (whether or not their relationship to the company is
technically considered "employment").
2 The term "settlement" is used in this discussion to describe settlements in civil
and administrative litigation, as well as deferred prosecution, nonprosecution, and
plea agreements in criminal prosecutions.
5 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys § VI.B (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Thompson Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_
organizations.pdf (outlining factors for prosecutors to consider in determining what
charges to bring against companies, including "whether the corporation appears to be
protecting its culpable employees and agents.., through the advancing of attorney's
fees...").
See infra Part I.C.2. Although governmental restrictions on indemnification are
relevant in a variety of contexts, this Comment will focus on their manifestations in the
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As the DOJ began to enforce the Thompson Memorandum's in-
demnification policy more aggressively, a backlash developed among
advocacy groups, courts, and legislators. At the core of their criticism
was the argument that the policy infringed on the right to counsel.
But by focusing on the traditional roots of this right-procedural due
process, the Sixth Amendment, and (perhaps less traditionally) sub-
stantive due process-critics phrased the constitutional concerns in a
manner that does not sufficiently protect defendants' access to coun-
sel. Even after the Thompson Memorandum was replaced by the
McNulty Memorandum," observers have continued to express reserva-
tions about the DOJ's policy, while also raising the concern that simi-
lar policies could be adopted by other agencies, such as the SEC. It is
thus essential that the discussion of these policies' constitutional rami-
fications be framed more effectively.
Unfortunately, the threshold conditions of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights do not mesh well with the realities of white-collar
investigations. Most significantly, the rights are at their weakest dur-
ing the investigatory stage, when governmental pressure and the need
for qualified counsel are nonetheless very strong. Even when these
constitutional guarantees do apply, they do so with very little force, in-
adequately protecting a white-collar defendant whose access to high-
quality legal advice is disrupted by the government.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are therefore not up to the task
of protecting individual rights in this context, but another doctrine
is-the right of access to the courts, which protects litigants' right to
legal advice free from government intervention.6 When viewed under
this framework, it becomes more apparent that even after recent revi-
sions, DOJ policy is unconstitutional and in need of further change.
The DOJ should continue to constrain indemnification, but it should
do so by limiting the indemnification of financial sanctions rather
than of attorneys' fees, looking to the SEC's existing policy as a useful
model.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the back-
ground of indemnification agreements, the government's reaction to
them, and the resulting backlash. Part II evaluates the constitutional-
context of DOJ white-collar criminal prosecutions and SEC enforcement actions, since
these actions are at the core of the current debate.
Memorandum from PaulJ. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo-
randum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnultymemo.pdf.
6 See infra Part IIf.
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ity of the anti-indemnification policies under the doctrines commonly
invoked by their critics-procedural due process, the Sixth Amend-
ment, and substantive due process-and examines why these doc-
trines do not adequately protect the right to counsel. Part III then
explains why the policies should instead be evaluated under the ac-
cess-to-courts doctrine. Finally, Part IV discusses how the DOJ's policy
could be modified to accomplish important policy goals within consti-
tutional boundaries.
I. INDEMNIFICATION AND GOVERNMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
A. The Financial Burden of Government Investigations
Companies are asked to indemnify their employees for three main
categories of expenses during white-collar investigations and litiga-
tion: attorneys' fees, penalties, and disgorgement. These expenses
can amount to millions of dollars for a single employee.
The complexity of modern white-collar cases can lead to substan-
tial attorneys' fees, in part because these cases often involve parallel
civil and criminal proceedings with extensive discovery during both
the investigation and litigation. Moreover, attorneys may perceive
relatively little need to contain the buildup of fees because they expect
to be paid by companies rather than the employees themselves.7 In-
deed, recent high-profile cases have generated staggering legal fees.
For instance, in a case brought by the SEC that settled shortly before
trial,8 four KPMG accountants together incurred over $20 million in
legal fees.9 Other KPMG employees defending an unrelated DOJ
prosecution incurred an average of $1.7 million each in pretrial legal
expenses before the case was dismissed.'o Trials naturally generate
even larger costs-senior executives in high-profile securities fraud
7 In many cases, a company's insurer, rather than the company itself, might pay
the expenses. The impact of these insurance policies is discussed below in Part I.B.2.b.
8 Four Current or Former KPMG Partners Settle SEC Litigation Relating to Xerox
Audits, Litigation Release No. 19,573 (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lr19573.htm.
9 This information was revealed in the context of different litigation against
KPMG employees because of their involvement with illegal tax shelters. See United
States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
10 United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The defen-
dants also incurred over $3 million in related regulatory inquiries and civil cases. Id. at
406-07.
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trials have incurred attorneys' fees ranging from $15 to $70 million."
Whereas indemnification can enable defendants to hire top-flight
firms, withdrawal of those funds can eliminate that option even for
wealthy defendants.'
2
The financial sanctions-penalties and disgorgement-in such
cases can also be considerable. Penalties in recent cases have often
reached hundreds of thousands of dollars.'3 Disgorgement and resti-
tution, which are based on the theory that an employee wrongfully re-
ceived compensation by participating in illegal activity, can also be
substantial. 4 For instance, when an employee is accused of account-
ing manipulations that inflated her employer's stock price, the gov-
ernment will often seek disgorgement of profits from stock sales or
It See id. at 424 (reviewing the trial costs in the Computer Associates, Adelphia,
and Enron cases, among others).
12 See id. at 415-16 (reporting that certain defendants were forced to fire attorneys
from Jones Day, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, Goodwin Procter, and Arent Fox
when KPMG stopped paying the defendants' legal expenses); id. at 423-24 (noting that
although most of the affected defendants were millionaires, their legal expenses, if in-
demnified, would have exceeded their assets); see also Paul Davies & David Reilly, In
KPMG Case, the Thorny Issue of Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at C5 (describing
the experience of a former Dynegy executive whose litigation resources were severely
constrained after Dynegy terminated indemnification pursuant to the DOJ's request
for better "cooperation"). For an extensive and illuminating account of the con-
straints faced by the defendants in United States v. Stein, which is discussed in more de-
tail in Part I.C.l.b, see Julie Triedman, Buried Alive, LITIG. 2007, Fall 2007, at 80 (supp.
to AM. LAW., Nov. 2007).
13 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Settles Options Backdating Case Against William
Sorin, Former General Counsel of Comverse Technology, Inc. (Jan. 10, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-4.htm [hereinafter Comverse Press Re-
lease] (announcing a $600,000 penalty); Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Fraud Charges
Against Former Restaurant Executives for Undisclosed Compensation and Accounting
Fraud (June 7, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-89.htm (announc-
ing a $500,000 penalty). Recent criminal sentences have resulted in lower fines, but
high forfeiture or restitution amounts. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Four Former Enterasys Executives Sentenced on Fraud, Conspiracy Charges (July 3,
2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/July/07-crm-475.html (an-
nouncing a $25,000 fine for accounting fraud); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Former Enron Chief Accounting Officer Richard Causey Sentenced to 66 Months in
Prison for Securities Fraud (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2006/November/06_crm_763.html (announcing a $25,000 fine for securities fraud).
In a recent SEC trial, a defendant was even ordered to pay a $10 million dollar penalty.
Press Release, SEC, Former Chairman and CEO of Gemstar-TV Guide International,
Inc. Ordered To Pay Over $22 Million for Role in Accounting Fraud (May 10, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-67.htm [hereinafter Gemstar Press Release].
14 Disgorgement can, of course, reach other types of funds, such as profits from
insider trading. However, in the indemnification context, compensation is a primary
source of disgorgement. There are, of course, distinctions between the theories of dis-
gorgement and restitution, but they are not salient to this discussion.
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performance-based compensation such as options and bonuses, caus-
ing disgorgement awards to reach millions of dollars. 15
B. Corporate Indemnification Policies
1. Justifications for Indemnification
Indemnification agreements and the statutes that permit or re-
quire them are driven by a number of important policy concerns.16
Companies and legislatures are concerned that the threat of personal
liability may discourage officers, directors, and employees from serv-
ing in important positions." By neutralizing these individuals' finan-
cial exposure, corporations can remove this disincentive. Coupled
15 See, e.g., Comverse Press Release, supra note 13 (announcing $1.6 million in
disgorgement); Gemstar Press Release, supra note 13 (announcing $10.6 million in
disgorgement); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Qwest Chief Executive
Officer Joseph Nacchio Sentenced to 72 Months in Prison for Insider Trading (July
27, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/press-releases/2007/07/
07-27-07nacchio-sent.pdf (announcing a $52 million restitution award for insider
trading). These amounts do not account for substantial prejudgment interest.
16 However, these justifications are not universally accepted. Commentators have
argued, for instance, that expansive indemnification powers allow corporations to
overrule judicial rulings about an individual's culpability and liability based only on the
corporation's perceived self-interest. See Mae Kuykendall, Symmetry and Dissonance in
Corporate Law: Perfecting the Exoneration of Directors, Corrupting Indemnification and Strain-
ing the Framework of Corporate Law, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 518 (characterizing
corporate indemnification decisions as a "practical veto" over judicial decisions). The
indemnification of legal fees has also been criticized "as an indeterminate form of pay-
out to managers with no link to performance" that has "blunted corporations' internal
controls" and "induce[d] moral hazard." Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate
Crime, Advancement of Executives'Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts (pt. I), 7 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. LJ. 2 (2006), http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article.asp?id=641.
17 See ERNEST L. FOLK, III ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 145.2 (3d ed. 1998) ("The invariant policy of section 145 is to promote the de-
sirable end that corporate officials will resist what they consider unjustified suits and
claims [and] ... to encourage capable persons to serve as corporate directors ...."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Current Status of Corporate
Directors' Right to Indemnfication, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1956) ("The director's
sword of Damocles is the individual liability to which he almost inevitably exposes him-
self .. "); Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059
(2006) (arguing that without indemnification, "qualified people may decide not to
serve as directors"); Kuykendall, supra note 16, at 452-54 (discussing the perceived
need to insulate directors from liability); Kurt A. Mayr, II, Note, Indemnification of Direc-
tors and Officers: The "Double Whammy" of Mandatory Indemnfication Under Delaware Law
in Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 42 VILL. L. REv. 223, 233 (1997) (noting
that indemnification statutes are intended in part "to encourage capable individuals to
serve as corporate directors and officers by allaying their concerns over potential per-
sonal liability").
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with this is a concern that courts may not evaluate corporate conduct
fairly, which could result in unfair judgments. Indemnification may
also encourage directors and employees to actively contest frivolous
litigation (rather than settling early to avoid large legal bills) with the
assurance that the company will compensate them for attorneys' fees
incurred in the process. '9 Finally, indemnification is seen as protect-
ing directors' and employees' freedom to act in the corporation's in-
terest without undue fear of litigation.20
Companies under investigation by federal authorities today must
weigh these benefits of indemnification against the substantial disad-
vantages of refusing government demands. As discussed in detail be-
low, companies refusing DOJ and SEC demands face substantial risk,
regardless of how the merits of the government's case are ultimately
decided. Complying with the government's demands can help com-
panies avoid indictment by the DOJ or civil charges by the SEC, pre-
liminary steps that themselves can have severe effects on companies.
2 '
2. Authority for Indemnification
a. Types of Indemnification
Indemnification has become common in American companies.
By the time a government investigation begins, companies are often
legally obligated to indemnify their employees for expenses incurred
in connection with the investigation. Even if indemnification is not
18 See Kuykendall, supra note 16, at 482-83 (describing permissive indemnification
as a means of "adjust[ing] the costs imposed on corporate agents by litigation" by
bringing "sound business judgment" to bear); id. at 493 (noting that mandatory in-
demnification was intended to prevent judicial review of the "quality of the underlying
facts in a director's successful defense of a lawsuit").
19 Mayr, supra note 17, at 233-34.
20 See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1059 (arguing that because "[t]oo much fear of
liability" may cause directors to "become excessively cautious," it can "reduce rather
than enhance the quality of board decisions"); see also Bishop, supra note 17, at 1058
("[A] director serving what he conceives to be the best interests of his corporation
may ... incur substantial personal liability ... ").
21 See Mary Beth Buchanan et al., Has the Government Gone Too Far in Its War on Cor-
porate Crime?, WALL ST. J. (online edition), Nov. 1, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB1 16224475563608109.html ("An indictment alone can send a company into
a death spiral: negative publicity, revocation of debts, debarment from government
business."); The McNulty Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investiga-
tions: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Home-
land Security, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum Hearings) (state-
ment of Andrew Weissman), available at LEXIS, CQ Transcriptions database ("[T]he
indictment can kill the company.").
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legally required, it may still be expected because of longstanding prac-
tice. Every state has statutes that allow or require indemnification un-
der various circumstances.2 2 For the sake of simplicity, this discussion
will focus on the provisions of Delaware corporate law, 3 which applies
to the bulk of large American corporations. 4
There are two categories of indemnification-mandatory and
permissive. Under Delaware law, mandatory indemnification only ap-
plies to directors and officers. Corporations are required to indem-
nify their present and former directors and officers (but not other
employees) against "expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and
reasonably incurred" 25 in connection with "any threatened, pending
or completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, ad-
,26ministrative or investigative."
The scope of permissive indemnification is even broader. Com-
panies are permitted to indemnify both present and former employ-
ees for both 'judgments" and "fines" incurred in civil, criminal, ad-
ministrative, and investigative proceedings.27 Companies can also
agree to more expansive indemnification than that discussed in the
22 See Robert P. McKinney, Special Project Note, Protecting Corporate Directors and
Officers: Indemnification, 40 VAND. L. REv. 737, 737-38 (1987) (describing the scope of
laws requiring or allowing indemnification and typical indemnification agreements).
23 Indemnification is not limited to corporations, however, and can be provided by
other business organizations. For instance, it was the "common practice" of the ac-
counting firm KPMG, a limited liability partnership, to indemnify its employees for at-
torneys' fees. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
214 See RonaldJ. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Func-
tion, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) ("The aggregated choices of a majority of pub-
licly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a convergence on the Delaware General
Corporation Law as a de facto national corporate law."); Guhan Subramanian, The In-
fluence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and
Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1795, 1813 (2002) (finding that the major-
ity of corporations are incorporated in Delaware); Division of Corporations, State of
Delaware, http://www.corp.delaware.gov (last visited Dec. 1, 2007) (claiming that
more than fifty percent of publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware).
Although there are some differences in the operation of various states' statutes, see
McKinney, supra note 22, at 738, these differences are not germane to this discussion.
The provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act are similar to Delaware law, al-
though they allow somewhat broader indemnification in certain circumstances. See
JamesJ. Hanks, Jr. & Larry P. Scriggins, Protecting Directors and Officers from Liability---The
Influence of the Model Business Corporation Act, 56 Bus. LAw. 3, 34 (2000).
25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (2001).
26 § 145(a); see also Mayr, supra note 17, at 238, 256-58 (discussing the broad scope
of indemnification allowed under section 145).
27 § 145(a).
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28293statute, and often do so by contract 29 or bylaw.30 Accordingly, even
though this is termed "permissive" indemnification, it may become es-
sentially mandatory for a company due to other agreements it has
made with its employees.' Moreover, even if companies do not create
formal indemnification policies or agreements, they still can and do
32indemnify employees as a matter of practice. Significantly, these
statutory provisions also permit indemnification prospectively-that is,
they allow companies to advance legal fees and other expenses to
their employees, subject to a requirement that the employee reim-
burse the company if she is later found to be ineligible for indemnifi-
cation.3
28 § 145(f); see also Theodore D. Moskowitz & Walter A. Effross, Turning Back the
Tide of Director and Officer Liability, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 897, 909 (1993) (noting that
most states have laws allowing companies to adopt permissive indemnification
schemes).
29 Even fifty years ago, corporations were advised to make "express contracts of
indemnification" to reimburse legal expenses and money damages, as long as the indi-
vidual's actions were neither knowingly nor "manifestly" illegal and the individual was
not found guilty of negligence or willful misconduct. Bishop, supra note 17, at 1077.
This trend has continued today. See Ronald E. Mallen & David W. Evans, Surviving the
Directors' and Officers' Liability Crisis: Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L.
439, 464 (1987) ("In order to attract and retain competent officers and independent
outsiders to their boards, many corporations have entered into agreements to indem-
nify their directors and officers for such expenses.").
30 See § 145(f) (referring to indemnification rights to which individuals "may be
entitled under [a] bylaw [or] agreement"); Black et al., supra note 17, at 1083 ("Almost
all public companies have indemnification agreements with outside directors or bylaws
that convert this permission into an obligation to directors by providing that the cor-
poration shall advance legal expenses and indemnify legal fees, damages, and amounts
paid in settlement to the fullest extent permitted by law.").
31 Mayr, supra note 17, at 253-54.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("While
KPMG's partnership agreement and bylaws are silent on the subject [of indemnifica-
tion] .... it had been the longstanding voluntary practice of KPMG to advance and pay
legal fees.., for partners, principals, and employees of the firm. .. ").
3 § 145(e); see also Kuykendall, supra note 16, at 496-97 (discussing the statutory
authority for providing advance commitments). Other states have adopted similar
provisions authorizing advance indemnification. Moskowitz & Effross, supra note 28, at
911-12. However, firms cannot necessarily expect reimbursement by employees, since
"[a] criminal defendant facing a serious sentence of imprisonment has little incentive
to leave her own assets unspent at the end of a case, and sanctioning regimes (fines,
forfeiture, restitution, and the like) are apt to take most or all of what may be left."
Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1658 (2007).
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b. Limitations on Indemnification Powers
There are two types of constraints on companies' power and obli-
gation to indemnify their employees. Together, they provide a power-
ful incentive to employees to settle an action on a "neither admit nor
deny" basis, rather than to litigate it and risk an adverse judgment or
verdict.
The first set of constraints is statutory. Mandatory indemnifica-
tion is statutorily required only when the officer or director is "suc-
cessful" in defending the action.3 There are similar constraints on a
corporation's power to award permissive indemnification. A corpora-
tion can indemnify only employees who "acted in good faith" and in a
manner "reasonably believed to be" legal and consistent with the cor-
poration's interests. 35 As a matter of public policy, indemnification is
not allowed when there is a finding that an individual intentionally
acted illegally.
Yet these statutory constraints may not be that powerful today. Al-
though indemnification statutes are based on a presumption that a
corporation will only choose to indemnify an employee when she
acted in the corporation's interest, the modern practice is to allow in-
demnification without making such factual findings. This is in large
part because indemnification contracts and bylaws create a strong
threat that an employee denied indemnification will sue the company,
making it inefficient for most corporations to withhold payment.
3
1
Moreover, neither a settlement nor even a conviction necessarily cre-
ates a presumption that the actions were taken without the requisite
good faith or reasonable belief in their legality.' On the other hand,
courts generally agree that a settlement in which a defendant neither




Moskowitz & Effross, supra note 28, at 905-06.
37 Kuykendall, supra note 16, at 511-12.
38 See § 145(a) ("The termination of any action ... by judgment, order, settlement,
[or] conviction ... shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act
in good faith and in a manner which the person reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation .... ").
39 See, e.g., Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding, based on a review of Delaware law, that the plaintiff was entitled to indemni-
fication for amounts paid in a civil settlement).
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In the absence of strong statutory constraints, Directors' and Offi-
cers' (D&O) insurance provides a more powerful incentive to pursue
settlement. Such insurance pays the costs of indemnification on be-
half of companies, and typically covers disgorgement and penalties in
addition to attorneys' fees. Since D&O insurance can save companies
from making multimillion-dollar payouts, companies have a consider-
able incentive to satisfy the terms of the insurance policies. 40  The
most important of these provisions is an exclusion for acts determined
by a final judgment to have been the product of "active and deliberate
dishonesty," such as fraud. 4' This exclusion creates an incentive for
directors and officers to settle the government's claims, since settle-
ments that "neither admit nor deny" the government's allegations do• 41
not trigger the exclusion.
40 See Moskowitz & Effross, supra note 28, at 919 (noting that "insurance can be a
director's or officer's only available source of relief"). For a broad survey of D&O in-
surance policies, see Mallen & Evans, supra note 29, and Joseph P. Monteleone &
Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Over-
view of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 Bus. LAW. 573 (1996). Studies have reported that
over ninety percent of companies buy D&O insurance. Eg.,John C. Coffee,Jr., Reform-
ing the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L.
REv. 1534, 1570 (2006); Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper Why the SEC Should
Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Policies,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1168 (2006). Companies use insurance coverage in part as a
recruitment tool for employees whose positions could subject them to liability. Grif-
fith, supra, at 1171-72.
41 See Mallen & Evans, supra note 29, at 455; see also Griffith, supra note 40, at 1191
& n.148.
42 See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1086; Mallen & Evans, supra note 29, at 455; see
also Susan Beck, Back in Black: Companies with Backdating Troubles Are Paying Astronomi-
cal Legal Fees, AM. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 22 (reporting that companies subject to options
backdating investigations have paid as much as $72 million for employees' legal fees, in
part because D&O insurers have denied payment "citing policy exclusions, such as
[for] when individuals engage in bad acts for personal profit"). When not covered by
insurance, such large payouts can threaten the very viability of a company. See, e.g.,
Karen Gullo, Brocade Legal Bills Outpace Profits in Options Cases, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct.
10, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid--aTLHudBFXBc#
(indicating that over one-third of Brocade Communications' profits in one quarter
had been consumed by its employees' legal fees).
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C. Government Anti-Indemnification Policies
1. DOJ Policy
a. The Thompson and McNulty Memoranda
Recently, a new type of constraint has emerged-government pol-
icy. The DOJ's policies were most famously codified in the Thompson
Memorandum, named for its author, then-Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson.43 The Thompson Memorandum, which was issued
in early 2003, outlined the factors for prosecutors to consider in de-
termining whether a company was "cooperating" with prosecutors,
and allowed prosecutors to reward a high level of cooperation with
more lenient terms in a settlement agreement, including the use of a
deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) or nonprosecution agree-
ment (NPA) instead of an indictment.44 One determinant of "coop-
43 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § VI.B. The Thompson Memorandum
was the successor to the "Holder Memorandum" written by former Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter
Holder Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/
reports/1999/chargingcorps.html. According to Mr. Holder, the initial policy was de-
signed to give prosecutors uniform guidelines for deciding when to indict corpora-
tions. See Posting of Peter Lattman to WSJ.com Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2006/12/13/the-holder-memo/ (Dec. 13, 2006, 8:47 EST); Interview with Eric Holder,
former Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, in Wash., D.C. (July 27, 2007). In its
revisions to the Holder Memorandum, the Thompson Memorandum put "increased
emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation" to "make
clear that" a company's failure to cooperate "should weigh in favor of a corporate
prosecution." Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at i. And whereas under the
Holder Memorandum, prosecutors were "not required to reference [its] factors in a
particular case" or treat them as "outcome-determinative," the Thompson Memoran-
dum required prosecutors to consider these factors. Holder Memorandum, supra, at 1;
see also Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys (Oct. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf
("The Thompson Memorandum sets forth nine factors that federal prosecutors must con-
sider in determining whether to charge a corporation or other business organization."
(emphasis added)). For a more extensive history of the evolution from the Holder
Memorandum to the McNulty Memorandum, see Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D.
McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department ofJustice's Corporate Charging Policies,
51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (2006).
44 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement 1 2, United States v. Monsanto Co.,
No. 05-0008 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
chargingdocs/monsantoagreement.pdf ("This Agreement reflects MONSANTO
COMPANYs previous actions in... cooperating in the government's... investiga-
tion .... "); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Computer Associates Execu-
tives Indicted on Securities Fraud, Obstruction Charges (Sept. 22, 2004), available at
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eration" was whether a company was indemnifying its employees' legal
fees. 45  After courts, legislators, and commentators criticized the
46Thompson Memorandum, the DOJ recrafted it in late 2006. The
new version, labeled the McNulty Memorandum after the subsequent
Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty, considerably softened the
language of the policy.4 7 Prosecutors are now advised that they "gen-
erally" should not consider "whether a corporation is advancing attor-
neys' fees to employees or agents under investigation and indict-
ment., 4s  When a corporation is advancing such fees under the
requirements of its charter or bylaws, or under an employment
agreement, this "cannot be considered a failure to cooperate."49
But despite initial DOJ fanfare regarding the McNulty Memoran-
dum's changes to the Thompson Memorandum, 5° concerns about the
DOJ's policy have persisted for a variety of reasons. 5' First, the terms
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/September/04_crm_642.htm (announcing a DPA
"[i] n light of [the company's] ... continued cooperation"); Press Release, U.S. Att'y, S.
Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Enters Non-Prosecution Agreement with Jenkens & Gilchrist in Con-
nection with Its Fraudulent Tax Shelter Activity (Mar. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/usaopress/2007/txdvO7jenkins&gilchristnppr.pdf (announc-
ing the defendant's "cooperation with the Government's investigation" as a factor that
positively influenced the entry into an NPA).
45 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, § VI.B.
46 This criticism is reviewed below in Part I.C.l.b.
47 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 5. McNulty initially defended the Thomp-
son Memorandum despite the Stein court's ruling, arguing that it enhanced the pre-
dictability of prosecutions for companies. See Lori Calabro, U.S. Deputy Attorney General
Paul McNulty, CFO.COM, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/
7851821/c_7873404.
48 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 5, § VII.B.3.
49 Id. The Thompson and Holder Memoranda had incorporated similar defer-
ence to "a corporation's compliance with governing law." Thompson Memorandum,
supra note 3, § VI.B n.4; Holder Memorandum, supra note 43, § VI.B n.3.
50 See, e.g., PaulJ. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared Re-
marks at the Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership Conference Regarding the Depart-
ment's Charging Guidelines in Corporate Fraud Prosecutions (Dec. 12, 2006), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag speech_061212.htm ("The
new guidelines now generally prohibit prosecutors from considering whether a corpo-
ration is advancing attorneys' fees to employees or agents under investigation or in-
dictment.").
51 See, e.g., McNulty Memorandum Hearings, supra note 21 (statement of Karen
Mathis, Pres., Am. Bar Ass'n) (arguing that the McNulty Memorandum "continues to
erode" employees' "right to effective counsel" by "pressuring [their] employers to take
unfair punitive actions against [them] during [government] investigations"); Jonathan
Peterson & Kathy M. Kristof, U.S. Eases Its Tactics on Suspect Firms, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2006, at C1 (quoting a law professor saying that the new provisions "won't stop" prose-
cutors, and instead "will just slow things down a bit"); Andrew Weissmann & Ana R.
Bugan, Thompson Gunners, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 26, 2007 ("Despite salutary provisions, the
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of the policy may themselves be inadequate. The apparent restric-
tions on considering indemnification are mitigated in a footnote that
allows prosecutors to consider the advancement of attorneys' fees
"[i]n extremely rare cases.... when the totality of the circumstances
show that it was intended to impede a criminal investigation" and
upon approval by the Deputy Attorney General. 2 Although this may
be a significant procedural hurdle, 53 the exception nonetheless indi-
cates to companies that their decision to indemnify their employees
could be used against them in the future.
Second, regardless of the McNulty Memorandum's terms, it con-
tinues to suggest to the defense bar that the DOJ will view indemnifi-
cation restrictions favorably. The policy only restricts prosecutors'
ability to affirmatively encourage constraints on indemnification-it
does not prevent prosecutors from accepting companies' offers to do
so. Given the DOJ's recent practice, companies might use indemnifi-
cation restrictions proactively to appease government decision mak-
ers. A former prosecutor has even suggested that the new policy es-
new policy does not go far enough."). On the other hand, some commentators do be-
lieve that the McNulty Memorandum's indemnification provisions "adequately re-
solve[] the problem of advancing attorneys' fees to employees under investigation."
John A. Tancabel, Reflections on the McNulty Memorandum, 35 SEC. REG. L.J. 219, 257
(2007).
52 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 5, § VII.B.3 n.3.
53 Indeed, former Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder has noted that a similar
requirement in other contexts has allowed DOJ officials to exercise more effective
oversight of line prosecutors. Interview with Eric Holder, supra note 43.
54 See Lynnley Browning, U.S. Moves To Restrain Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2006, at C1 ("[T]he message to... the company [is still,] 'Well, if we [withhold in-
demnification], we might just score some brownie points."' (citation omitted)); Abbe
D. Lowell et al., Is the DOJ's New Policy on Prosecuting Corporations Real Reform or Business
as Usual?, LAW.cOM, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleFriendlyLLFjsp?
id=1170151352731 ("The pressure on corporations to accede to a prosecutor's 're-
quest' .. . to make life difficult for suspected employees is still too great so long as the
practical reality of failing to do what the government wants is corporate suicide. With-
out an actual ban of these tactics, prosecutors can wink and nod, and companies will
feel that the best way to avoid indictment is to do that which the government used to
demand directly."); Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, ABAJ.
EREPORT, Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/dl5specter.html
(quoting American Bar Association (ABA) officials commenting that since the new
policy still allows prosecutors to give companies cooperation credit, it was just a "baby
step"); Julie O'Sullivan, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Remarks at the American
Criminal Law Review Symposium, Corporate Criminality: Legal, Ethical, and Managerial
Implications (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?
eventlD=-324 (commenting that the McNulty Memorandum's procedural protections
may "create a deterrent for borderline requests," but the "big exception that threatens
to swamp the policy is that none of these approval requirements are applicable where
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sentially encourages companies to simply fire employees in lieu of re-
stricting indemnification of their expenses. 5 Naturally, this situation
can affect how vigorously an individual employee will fight the gov-
ernment's charges. 6
Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV, the scope
of the policy may be too narrow. It could be more effectively targeted
to contain the indemnification of financial sanctions, rather than at-
torneys' fees. Accordingly, it should also be applied by the DOJ not
only in settlement negotiations with companies, but in negotiations
with employees themselves.
b. The Backlash
The DOJ's anti-indemnification policy achieved notoriety in mid-
2006 after a judge in the Southern District of New York held the pol-
icy unconstitutional in United States v. Stein.5 Stein arose from a mas-
sive federal investigation of tax shelters designed by KPMG. The in-
vestigation threatened to result in a potentially devastating indictment
of the firm, encouraging KPMG leaders to negotiate with prosecu-
the corporation 'volunteers,"' which is the typical practice); see also McNulty Memoran-
dum Hearings, supra note 21 (statement of Richard White, Chairman, Association of
Corporate Counsel) (arguing that the McNulty Memorandum infringes employee
rights to effective assistance of counsel, and that it "misses the point" because "federal
enforcement officials rely almost exclusively, in practice, on informal demands").
Indeed, it is not clear that underlying DOJ preferences have changed at all. While
speaking about the component of the McNulty Memorandum protecting against re-
quests for privilege waivers, the Chief of Staff to Deputy Attorney General McNulty
noted that it is "in the interest of corporations that are under investigation... [to] ul-
timately make the decision to waive the attorney-client privilege." Michael Elston,
Chief of Staff and Counselor, Office of the Deputy Att'y Gen., Remarks at the
American Criminal Law Review Symposium, Corporate Criminality: Legal, Ethical,
and Managerial Implications (Mar. 15, 2007) (hereinafter Elston], available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=324.
5 McNulty Memorandum Hearings, supra note 21 (statement of Andrew Weissman);
see also id. (statement of William M. Sullivan Jr., Partner, Winston & Strawn, LLP) (not-
ing that even after the issuance of the McNulty Memorandum, he had received re-
quests from the DOJ to threaten to fire employees in lieu of withholding indemnifica-
tion).
56 See Lowell et al., supra note 54 ("[Under the Thompson Memorandum,] com-
panies ... cut off [employees'] defense fees to avoid a corporate death sentence that
could result merely from being charged. These actions often led the employees
caught in the crossfire to enter plea bargains, not because they truly felt they had vio-
lated the law but because they could not fight both the prosecutors and their employ-
ers.").
57 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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tors.58 During these negotiations, prosecutors indicated that under
the Thompson Memorandum, KPMG was more likely to be indicted if
it continued to reimburse its employees' legal expenses. 59 To avoid
indictment, the firm would need to break from the "longstanding vol-
untary practice of KPMG to advance and pay legal fees.., in any civil,
criminal or regulatory proceeding involving activities arising within
the scope of the individual's duties and responsibilities as a KPMG
partner, principal, or employee. " 60 Although this policy was not em-
bodied in KPMG's bylaws or partnership agreement, it was well estab-
lished: even as KPMG was considering the DOJ's demand, four of its
partners were together accruing over $20 million defending an SEC
61lawsuit in a separate matter.
A few weeks later, KPMG acquiesced. It informed its employees
facing investigation that the firm would only pay their legal expenses
if they cooperated with the government 62 and were not indicted. 6 It
also imposed a $400,000 cap on reimbursement.6 4  Pursuant to the
DOJ's request, KPMG later issued another memorandum to its em-
ployees suggesting that they may not need to be represented by coun-
sel at all. 5 The government also regularly notified KPMG when its
employees "failed to comply with government demands," and KPMG• • • 66
responded by threatening to withhold indemnification. When an
58 See David Reilly, How a Chastened KPMG Got by Tax-Shelter Cisis, WALL ST.J., Feb.
15, 2007, at Al (calling the investigation "a near-death experience" for KPMG).
59 See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. at 344 ("[W]hile the [DOJ] did not say in so many
words that it did not want KPMG to pay legal fees, no one at the meeting could have
failed to draw that conclusion.").
60 Id. at 340 (citation omitted).
61 Id.
62 Among other things, if an employee asserted the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination privilege, this would be considered uncooperative behavior. Id. at 345.
63 Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 345. Compare this figure to the multimillion-dollar attorneys' fees in-
curred by individuals in similar situations. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
65 See id. at 346 ("KPMG capitulated to the USAO demand. It put out in 'Q & A'
format a document containing the following language: 'Do I have to be assisted by a
lawyer? Answer: No. Although we believe that it is probably in your best interests to
consult with a lawyer before speaking to government representatives, whether you do
so is entirely your choice.... [Y]ou may deal directly with government representatives
without counsel. In any event, the Firm expects you to cooperate fully with the gov-
ernment representatives and provide complete and truthful information to them.'"
(citation and emphasis omitted)).
6 Id. at 347.
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employee did not comply, the firm terminated both her employment
and the reimbursement of her legal fees. 7
The government eventually agreed not to indict the firm, instead
entering into a DPA6 with KPMG.0 The DPA contained a require-
67 Id. The events at KPMG were not unique. In one case involving facts similar to
those in Stein, a defendant ignored his attorney's advice not to participate in an inter-
view by government agents because he "felt constrained by the need to maintain his
employment and secure indemnification for his legal fees." Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendant Robert D. Graham's Motion in Limine To Exclude His State-
ments at Trial at 5, United States v. Ferguson, No. 06-0137 (D. Conn. Aug. 1, 2007),
available at 2007 WL 2776447. In another case, Dynegy suspended payments of legal
fees during an employee's trial in an effort to comply with the Thompson Memoran-
dum's dictates. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Jamie Olis'
Motion To Set Aside His Conviction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, at 44, United States
v. Ois, No. 03-0217 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Olis Habeas Petition], avail-
able at http://blog.kir.com/archives/images/3F%2001is%2Memo%20in%20support%
20of%2Omm %20to%20set%20aside.pdf.
68 DPAs "are a form of probation" in which "the government agrees to suspend
charges against a company so long as the company fulfills every obligation set forth in a
detailed 'contract."' Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 321 (2007). The terms of DPAs can be extensive:
Entry into a DPA ordinarily will coincide with the filing of formal criminal
charges against a company, the suspension of Speedy Trial Act considerations,
and the tolling of the statute of limitations. Prosecutors agree not to pursue
the charges and to dismiss them after a period of time (generally between one
and two years) if the corporation honors all of the terms of the agreement. In
return, corporations undertake reforms, pledge active and complete coopera-
tion with the ongoing investigation, and pay substantial civil penalties and vic-
tim restitution. Companies will often be required to engage the services of a
monitor or examiner during the diversion period to review and report on
compliance efforts. DPAs... also include a version of allocution: a recitation
of the alleged illegalities and acceptance of responsibility for them.
Id. at 322 (footnotes omitted).
Prosecutors have increasingly used DPAs rather than indictments in order to ad-
dress conduct in more "creative and flexible ways" than judicially imposed sanctions,
which can often result in undesired "collateral consequences" for employees and
shareholders. Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of
Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for
the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1043-44
(2006); see also Griffin, supra, at 330 ("Prosecutors are justifiably reluctant to cause such
extensive economic harm."); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal
Law, 1 BROoK.J. CoRP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 57 tbl.A (2006) (documenting the recent
rise in the use of DPAs and NPAs); id. at 55-56 (noting that companies prefer DPAs to
indictments because they are less widely publicized and more subject to the company's
control than judicial sentences). Accordingly, most DPAs require the company to in-
stitute a compliance program to address the problems that initially prompted the in-
vestigation. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 894-95
(2007). DPAs have also been criticized, however, for causing the corporation to be
"effectively deputize[d]" as a government agent in investigations of employees. Griffin,
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ment that "KPMG agree[] to cooperate fully and actively with ... the
government.., regarding any matter relating to [this] investiga-
tion. "7 But the DPA only applied to proceedings against the firm; the
government soon indicted certain individuals, triggering the firm's
new policy of terminating indemnification. 7' These defendants then
moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming "that the government had
interfered improperly with the advancement of attorneys' fees by
KPMG in violation of their constitutional and other rights. 7 1 In re-
sponse, the DOJ announced that it would not construe KPMG's ad-
vancement of legal fees as a violation of the DPA.
73
Despite this concession, the court held the Thompson Memoran-
dum's fee indemnification provisions unconstitutional. 4  It identified
two constitutional violations. Applying the framework announced by
the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg,7 the court held that
the government had violated the defendants' substantive due process
right "to obtain and use in order to prepare a defense resources law-
fully available to [them], free of knowing or reckless government in-
terference." 76 The court also determined that the Thompson Memo-
randum violated the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel
of their choice. 7  A year later, the court dismissed the indictments
78against the individuals deprived of indemnification.
supra, at 336. NPAs are similar to DPAs, but instead provide that the government will
not "file charges at all if certain conditions are met." Id. at 321 n.42; see also Finder &
McConnell, supra note 43, at 17 (finding that the other terms of NPAs and DPAs are
similar). For summaries of the terms of recent DPAs and NPAs, see Finder & McCon-
nell, supra note 43, at 36 app.; Garrett, supra, at 938 app. A; and Orland, supra, at 86-87
tbls.I & II.
69 Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349-50.
70 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. KPMG, LLP, No. 05-0903
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005).
71 Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
72 Id. For more on the effect of the KPMG policy on the defendants in Stein, see
supra notes 10, 12, and accompanying text.
73 Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
74 Id. at 382.
75 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
76 Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 361; see also id. at 362, 365.
77 Id. at 365-66.
78 United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The court had
initially attempted to force KPMG to indemnify its employees by creating an ancillary
proceeding for the individual defendants to sue KPMG. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 380.
This effort was short-lived: the Second Circuit responded by issuing a writ of manda-
mus, holding that the district court's "exercise of ancillary jurisdiction ... [had been]
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In the wake of Stein, criticism of the Thompson Memorandum
grew. Business79 and other advocacy groups 8° began to argue for its
revision. Congress held hearings regarding the policy and introduced
legislation to restrict it-the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act,
which would prevent federal prosecutors and enforcement officials
from basing charging decisions on whether a company "is cooperating
with the Government," such as through "the provision of counsel to,
or contribution to the legal defense fees or expenses of, an em-
ployee." 81 In part to avoid these statutory restrictions, the DOJ issued
the McNulty Memorandum; yet, as discussed, commentators argued
that the new policy had a similar impact on access to counsel.82
clearly outside [proper] boundaries." Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753, 760 (2d Cir.
2007).
79 A representative example of this criticism is the report of the Committee on
Capital Markets Regulation, a group of corporate executives and attorneys. The report
recommended "that the Justice Department revise its prosecutorial guidelines to pro-
hibit federal prosecutors from seeking... the denial of attorneys' fees to employees,
officers, or directors." COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 14
(2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee Interim-ReportREV2.pdf.
Defense attorneys have made similar statements. See, e.g., David Hechler, New York AG
Presses Companies To Stop Paying Indicted Employees' Legal Bills, LAw.COM, Nov. 2, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1162375516746 (quoting a defense attorney
arguing that settlements barring indemnification are "fundamentally a denial of due
process").
80 See Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Assault on Thompson Memo: KPMG and
Beyond, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5, 2006, at 3, 3 (reporting on an ABA recommendation that
prosecutors not consider whether an "organization provided counsel to, or advanced,
reimbursed or indemnified the legal fees and expenses of, an employee"); Brian W.
Walsh, The Heritage Found., What We Have Here Is Failure To Cooperate: The
Thompson Memorandum and Federal Prosecution of White-Collar Crime 13 (Nov. 6,
2006), http://www.heritage.org/research/legalissues/upload/lmj9.pdf ("[A]l1 of the
Memorandum's references to a company's payment of its employees' legal fees should
be eliminated. Justice traditionally has been best served when all parties to criminal
litigation are well represented by experienced, diligent counsel."); see also Lynnley
Browning, Judges Press Companies That Cut Off Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at CI
(reviewing criticisms of the Thompson Memorandum).
81 See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, H.R. 3013, 110th
Cong. § 3(a) (2007) ("In any Federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement
matter, an agent or attorney of the United States shall not.., condition a civil or
criminal charging decision relating to a[n] organization, or person affiliated with that
organization, on, or use as a factor in determining whether an organization, or person
affiliated with that organization, is cooperating with the Government[,] ... the provi-
sion of counsel to, or contribution to the legal defense fees or expenses of, an em-
ployee of that organization ...."); see also Lynnley Browning, Justice Department Is Re-
viewing Corporate Prosecution Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at C3 (reporting that
Senators Specter and Leahy called the policies "coercive").
82 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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2. SEC Policy
The SEC has adopted a different strategy in its anti-
indemnification policy. First, and most significantly, it does not penal-
ize a company for indemnifying attorneys' fees. Rather, it attempts to
control inappropriate indemnification through its policy against the
indemnification of penalties. Second, the SEC has made it clear that
it will enforce its policy directly against individual defendants, rather
than indirectly by persuading companies to cut off funding for their
employees.
Like the DOJ policy, the SEC policy has taken form only in recent
years, and has developed as a matter of agency policy rather than
through legislation or rulemaking. To a limited extent, SEC rules do
embody the agency's anti-indemnification position: securities regis-
tration statements must include a recital of the SEC's position that in-
demnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act (that is,
liabilities related to the registration of securities) "is against public
policy as expressed in the Act and is therefore unenforceable." 83 But
this position does not appear to have directly influenced SEC en-
forcement policy.S4
Nor does the SEC rely on statutory authority for its indemnifica-
tion policy. Although a few statutes bar indemnification, this is the
exception rather than the rule. 5 For instance, a provision of the In-
vestment Company Act prohibits indemnification for certain viola-
86tions by officers and directors. Similarly, the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act (FCPA), which provides for fines against employees of U.S.
87companies for bribing foreign officials, mandates that "such fine[s]
may not be paid, directly or indirectly, by [the] issuer."88 Finally, the
SEC may have authority under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to bar indem-
8 17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (2007); see also Griffith, supra note 40, at 1196-97 (reviewing
SEC policies on indemnification).
84 See Coffee, supra note 40, at 1568 ("[N]either courts nor the SEC have extended
this policy to apply to settlement payments or defense costs where the defendants do
not admit liability.").
85 See Dale A. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of Its Directors and Officers
from Personal Liability, 1983 WIS. L. REv. 513, 559-61 (discussing the "few selected areas"
in which federal law regulates corporate indemnification of directors and officers).
86 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (2000).
87 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
88 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (3).
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nification payments, although the agency's use of this authority has
been infrequent.
89
The SEC's pertinent anti-indemnification policy has instead
evolved largely as a matter of SEC Enforcement practice,90 which has
built on a 2001 policy statement known as the "Seaboard Report."'"
The Report outlines the criteria that the SEC uses to determine
whether to bring enforcement actions against companies (rather than
just individuals), focusing on two categories of behavior: the nature of
the misconduct and the extent of the company's cooperation with the
Enforcement investigation.9 2 Although the Seaboard Report was the
first statement to reach even that level of detail,93 it mentions only
vague criteria regarding cooperation, asking whether the company
"cooperate[d] completely" and made "all reasonable efforts to secure
[its employees'] cooperation. 9 4  In 2003, the Chairman of the SEC
89 This authority may come in two forms. First, section 1103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(c) (3) (A) (i) (Supp. III 2004), authorizes the SEC to
freeze "extraordinary payments" to their employees during an investigation, a power
that the agency has used at least once to freeze indemnification payments. See Com-
plaint, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-4963 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17588.htm (applying for an injunc-
tion against WorldCom "making any extraordinary payments" to employees, including
"indemnification payments"). Second, section 402, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k), prohibits
"personal loan[s]" to officers and directors, and some commentators have suggested
that the advancement of legal fees could be deemed to be a loan. See Robert S. Ben-
nett et al., Internal Investigations and the Defense of Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62
Bus. LAW. 55, 75-76 (2006). However, the SEC does not appear to have adopted this
interpretation, see id., and at least one court has rejected it. See Envirokare Tech, Inc. v.
Pappas, 420 F. Supp. 2d 291, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
90 See Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of
2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash with Donaldson over Turf, the Choice of
Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L.
443, 463-65 (2004) (reviewing government policies regarding indemnification and
"cooperation," and describing their application in recent cases); Marvin G. Pickholz &
Jason R. Pickholz, Investigations Put Employees in Tough Spot, N.Y. L.J., July 24, 2006, at
10, 10 (describing the evolution of the SEC's policy).
91 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(A) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter
Seaboard Report], available at 2001 WL 1301408.
92 Id.
93See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 30 (2006), http://
www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0603sec.htm ("[P]rior to the issuance of
the [Seaboard] Report .... the Commission had not issued formal guidance on the
benefits of cooperation." (footnote omitted)).
94 Seaboard Report, supra note 91, at *3. The SEC reaffirmed the importance of
cooperation in a 2006 press release that explained the Commission's view on "whether,
2007]
512 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
publicly announced his belief that it is inappropriate, as a matter of
public policy, for companies to pay their employees' disgorgement
and penalties. 95 In a prominent application of this policy, the SEC
announced that Lucent would pay an especially high penalty in part
because the company had "expanded the scope of employees that
could be indemnified against the consequences of [the] SEC en-
forcement action" "without being required to do so by state law or its
corporate charter."96
The SEC also extended this policy to individuals. Rather than just
encouraging companies to withhold indemnification from their em-
ployees, the Commission now requires all "settling parties to forgo any
rights they may have to indemnification, reimbursement by insurers,
or favorable tax treatment of penalties."9 7 (As noted above, indemni-
fication law and D&O insurance encourage defendants to settle cases
rather than litigating them to trial.9 Settlements thus give Enforce-
ment staff considerable latitude to shape sanctions.) This policy has
been widely enforced in recent years. Although the policy has gener-
ally been applied only to the indemnification of penalties, 99 the SEC
and if so to what extent, to impose civil penalties against a corporation." Press Release,
SEC, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial
Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm. The statement
announced that "the appropriateness of a penalty on [a] corporation... turns princi-
pally on" the existence of a "direct benefit to the corporation" and the "degree to
which the penalty will... further harm" shareholders. Id. However, it also reiterated
that the "degree to which a corporation has.., cooperated with the investigation and
remediation of [an] offense" was an important consideration for the Commission. Id.
95 See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the New York Fi-
nancial Writers Association (June 5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch060503whd.htm ("I'm concerned about companies that, under permissive
state laws, indemnify their officers and directors against disgorgement and penalties
ordered in law enforcement actions .... [T]his just isn't good public policy.").
96 Press Release, SEC, Lucent Settles SEC Enforcement Action Charging the
Company with $1.1 Billion Accounting Fraud (May 17, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2004-67.htm.
97 Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., SEC Div. of Enforcement, Speech by SEC Staff: 24th
Annual Ray GarrettJr. Corporate & Securities Law Institute (Apr. 29, 2004), http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042904smc.htm.
98 See supra Part I.B.2.b.
See, e.g., SEC Wants Execs To Pay Fines Out of Their Own Pockets, L.A. TIMES, June
17, 2003, at C5 (reporting that in their settlement with the SEC, Xerox executives were
forced to pay $3 million in penalties out of pocket, but not $19 million in disgorge-
ment); Press Release, SEC, The Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD and the
New York Stock Exchange Permanently Bar Henry Blodget from the Securities Indus-
try and Require $4 Million Payment (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2003-56.htm (announcing that the defendant had "agreed that he will not
seek reimbursement or indemnification for the penalties he pays").
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has occasionally insisted that defendants relinquish rights to the in-
demnification of disgorgement as well.'00
Thus far, however, the SEC has not attempted to restrict the in-
demnification of attorneys' fees. Yet it has not escaped the concern of
critics who believe that the SEC is either informally penalizing com-
panies for indemnifying attorneys' fees or will change its policy in the
future. In February 2007, for instance, the American Bar Association
sent a letter to the Chairman of the SEC expressing concern that the
"reasonable efforts"1"" language in the Seaboard Report might one day
be interpreted as mandating restrictions on the indemnification of at-
torneys' fees.10 2 The letter urged revisions clarifying that fee indemni-
fication should not be considered in corporate charging decisions. 1
03
3. The Government'sJustifications for Restricting Indemnification
The McNulty Memorandum's indemnification provisions are justi-
fied as fulfilling several goals. First, the policy promotes greater
transparency and consistency in decisions to charge corporations
100 See, e.g., Healthsouth Founder Settles SEC Fraud Action for $81 Million, Litiga-
tion Release No. 20,084 (Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
2007/lr20084.htm ("Scrushy has agreed to refrain from seeking indemnification or
reimbursement from any third-party for any part of the $81 million [in penalties and
disgorgement] required by the FinalJudgment .. "); Consent of DefendantJack Ben-
jamin Grubman 6, SEC v. Grubman, No. 03-2938 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/consentl811 lb.htm ("Defendant agrees that
he shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification,
including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with re-
gard to all amounts that Defendant shall pay pursuant to... the Final Judg-
ment ... ").
I See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
102 Letter from Karen J. Mathis, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Christopher Cox,
Chairman, SEC (Feb. 5, 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/
attyclient/2007feb05_privwaivsec l.pdf. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has made
similar recommendations. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 93, at 8 ("The
Commission should not impose fines on corporations for lack of cooperation in its in-
vestigations... [and] should make clear that it does not disfavor and will not deem
uncooperative corporations that either indemnify or advance legal expenses for their
employees in connection with SEC investigations or litigation."). Moreover, the SEC's
actions in certain settlements have triggered some concern-not necessarily justified-
that the SEC silently imposes harsher penalties on corporations for indemnifying their
employees' legal expenses. See id. at 33 ("[T]he Commission should reevaluate
whether it is appropriate to impose penalties for providing for the legal representation
of corp orate employees.").
1. See Letter from KarenJ. Mathis to Christopher Cox, supra note 102.
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S 104rather than just individual wrongdoers. Second, it discourages
companies from using their indemnification leverage to prevent em-
ployees from testifying or otherwise providing information to the gov-
ernment. 0 5 Third, this in turn ensures that companies are charged• 1 0 6
based on a full understanding of the evidence. Fourth, by reward-
ing companies that cooperate, the policy promotes fairness-the rela-
tively good actor is treated better than the relatively bad actor. '
Fifth, it facilitates government investigations of corporate misconduct.
This has three secondary benefits: it allows the DOJ to "conserve[]
public resources" for other investigations, 0 8 it serves the public inter-
est by preserving investor confidence in the markets, 0 9 and it helps
corporations under investigation protect their stock prices by promot-
ing a rapid resolution to an investigation. '0
The SEC policy generally focuses on different concerns. Like the
DOJ, the SEC initially formulated its policy to make corporate charg-
ing decisions more transparent and consistent." Instead of focusing
on the indemnification of attorneys' fees, however, the SEC discour-
104 See McNulty Memorandum Hearings, supra note 21 (statement of Barry M. Sabin,
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (describing the McNulty Memorandum as the DOJ's "at-
tempt[] to transparently and thoughtfully articulate the manner in which it goes about
its corporate criminal charging decisions"); Interview with Eric Holder, supra note 43
(noting that the Holder Memorandum was prompted by the defense bar's desire for
greater consistency).
105 See Paul J. McNulty, supra note 50 ("Corporations may use advancement.., to
stop the flow of information from the company to the government so that we cannot
investigate the conduct effectively."); see also United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d
390, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that prosecutors construed the Thompson Memo-
randum to discourage indemnification "when the Government believed such payments
were part of an effort.., to appear cooperative while protecting culpable employees"
(citation omitted)). Although the DOJ embraces this as a primary goal of the anti-
indemnification policy today, this concern did not play a significant role in motivating
the Holder Memorandum. Interview with Eric Holder, supra note 43.
100 See McNulty Memorandum Hearings, supra note 21 (statement of Barry M. Sabin,
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) ("We are seeking to ensure that we have [a] full and com-
plete understanding of a factual nature [of the conduct], in order to make appropriate
charging decisions.. ").
107 See Elston, supra note 54 (" [I] f a corporation cooperates in an investigation, [it]
deserve [s] credit for that cooperation.... [N]ot all corporations cooperate.").
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., Cooperation and Corporate Steward-
ship, Remarks to the Corporate Counsel Institute (Mar. 8, 2007), http://
www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2007/dag-speech070308.htm.
I See Press Release, SEC, supra note 94 ("The Commission believes it important
to provide the maximum possible degree of clarity, consistency, and predictability in
explaining the way that its corporate penalty authority will be exercised.").
[Vol. 156:491
INDEMNTICA TION OF A 7TORNEYS' FEES
aged the indemnification of penalties. In the SEC's view, allowing
companies to pay employees' attorneys' fees serves the useful role of
promoting effective representation.1 2  Allowing indemnification of
penalties and disgorgement, on the other hand, potentially defeats
the purposes of these sanctions. An employee whose company is pay-
ing her penalty is not penalized for her illegal actions, and the penalty
is less likely to serve as an effective deterrent to others. 113
II. TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
ANTI-INDEMNIFICATION POLICIES
Criticism of DOJ policy has focused on its possible violations of
the right to counsel incorporated in the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.11 4 Although these embodiments of the right are certainly im-
plicated by the anti-indemnification policies, they have too many ex-
ceptions to effectively protect defendants' access to counsel. This Part
reviews the deficiencies of procedural due process, the Sixth Amend-
ment, and substantive due process as protections of the right to coun-
sel in this context. Part III then argues that we should instead turn to
the access-to-courts doctrine-a doctrine that could more effectively
protect litigants against governmental interference with their right to
seek legal advice.
A. Procedural Due Process
It is well established that the right to procedural due process in-
corporates a right to counsel. As the Court has recognized, due proc-
ess requires notice and a hearing," 5 and under Powell v. Alabama, a
112 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch et al., Panel Discussion, Bigger Carrots and Bigger Sticks: Is-
sues and Developments in Corporate Sentencing, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 161, 183
(2006) (quoting Steve Cutler, the former Director of the SEC's Division of Enforce-
ment, saying that the SEC did not discourage the indemnification of legal fees because
"[w]e like there to be good lawyers representing all interested parties").
113 See id. at 183-84 ("If an individual can look to his or her employer to pay the
freight and bear the cost of a penalty.... [w] hat deterrence have we really achieved?");
Cutler, supra note 97 ("Despite the fact that penalties, like disgorgement, can now be
used to compensate harmed investors, they are still fundamentally a punitive measure
intended to enhance deterrence of securities laws violations.").
114 See, e.g., Olis Habeas Petition, supra note 67, at 45-69; see also supra notes 51, 54,
and 74-77.
115 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970) (requiring that a welfare recipient be
"allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires" and that the attorney be permitted at a
hearing regarding the termination of benefits); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68
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"hearing" necessarily includes "the right to the aid of counsel when
desired and provided by the party asserting the right."" 6 Under Chan-
dler v. Fretag, a criminal defendant's "right to be heard through his
own counsel" is "unqualified."17 Although the due process and Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel share philosophical underpinnings,
they establish independent constitutional guarantees."" For instance,
prospective defendants have a due process right to retained counsel
before indictment, even where they would not have a Sixth Amend-
ment right to it." 9 Moreover, procedural due process, unlike the
Sixth Amendment, 20 applies to civil actions, such as those brought by
the SEC.121
There seem to be two plausible ways in which the anti-
indemnification policies may violate the due process right to counsel.
(1932) (pointing to notice, hearing, and proper jurisdiction as the "basic elements of
the constitutional requirement of due process").
116 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69 (identifying the right to counsel as an element of
due process in both civil and criminal cases, and applying it to the states); see also U.S.
Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990) (recognizing a "due process right
to obtain legal representation"). Of course, in certain proceedings, there is no due
process right even to retained counsel. For instance, when the presence of counsel
would make proceedings unjustifiably adversarial or would reduce efficiency, the
Court has held that there is no right to retained counsel. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 120-22 (1975) (holding that the presence of counsel is not constitution-
ally required at probable cause hearings because "adversary safeguards are not essen-
tial for the... determination"); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974) (deny-
ing inmates the right to retained counsel at prison disciplinary proceedings); Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973) (suggesting that "the significant interests in in-
formality, flexibility, and economy" may override the right to retained counsel in pa-
role proceedings). However, since the government does not dispute individuals' right
to the presence of counsel at pretrial proceedings, this exception would not defeat the
due process right to counsel.
117 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954); see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
616 (1974) (recognizing a defendant's right to "privately retain[]" a "legal arsenal" to
establish her innocence).
118 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 66.
119 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (suggesting that due process rights
apply when the government creates proceedings that form "an integral part of the ...
system for finally adjudicating [an individual's] guilt" (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 18 (1956)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358,
365-66 (1970) (affirming that due process rights apply even when proceedings are not
styled as criminal prosecutions); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 41 (1967) (finding a right
to counsel because a proceeding could cause an individual's freedom to be curtailed).
120 See infra note 147.
121 See, e.g., SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 659 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring due
process in a subpoena enforcement action by the SEC); cf MFS Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 380
F.3d 611, 617-18 (2d Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that decisions made by the Commis-
sion are constrained by due process).
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First, by interfering with a defendant's capacity to pay for counsel, the
government may be unconstitutionally restricting a defendant's
choice of counsel. Second, the government may be interfering with a
defendant's right to adequate representation, either by creating a con-
flict of interest between an attorney's duty to her client and her reli-
ance on the employer for compensation, or by causing a defendant to
switch counsel so close to trial that she receives poor representation.
Before these applications of due process are explored, however, a
threshold condition must be assessed: whether there is even a "depri-
vation" that triggers due process rights.
1. "Deprivation"
The biggest drawback of analyzing the constitutionality of the
McNulty Memorandum under a due process framework is that due
process simply may not protect many individuals. Due process only
applies when the government causes a qualifying deprivation "of life,
liberty, or property."'2 2  If the government never brings an action
against an individual, it will not have caused a deprivation of liberty or
property in the classic sense.113 Thus, due process rights are unlikely
to serve potential defendants well in most investigations. There are
two exceptions to this. If an employee is fired for failing to cooperate
with an investigation, she may be able to argue that the government
caused a deprivation of property by inducing the company to fire
her. 124 Arguably, however, it was the employee rather than the gov-
ernment that caused this result. Similarly, an employee might assert a
property interest in indemnification expenses, but this is a tenuous
argument where a company is not legally obligated to provide indem-
nification; and where a company is legally obligated to provide in-
demnification, the government has demonstrated greater reluctance
to intervene. 125 As a general matter, many individuals affected by anti-
indemnification policies may therefore not even be in a position to in-
voke due process to challenge constraints on their access to counsel.
122 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
123 Cf SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984) ("The Due Process
Clause is not implicated [during an investigation] because an administrative investiga-
tion adjudicates no legal rights .... "); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960)
("[W]hen governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example,
when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that
the full panoply ofjudicial procedures be used.").
124 For illustrations of this, see supra notes 55, 67, and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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It might be tempting to argue that a deprivation occurs when the
government starts an investigation of an individual, because of the
harm that such an investigation can do to her reputation. Indeed, the
126
Court has occasionally protected a "liberty interest in reputation" _
due process may be required when "a person's good name, reputa-
tion, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him."1 27 This seems justified because, as Justice Stevens has
noted in dissent, "an official accusation of serious crime has a direct
impact on a range of identified liberty interests."1 8 But the reach of
this principle is limited. In Paul v. Davis, the Court rejected a claim
that the plaintiff's liberty interest was injured when the police posted
his name and photograph on a flyer about "active shoplifters," despite
any reputational damage he may have suffered.129  It thus seems
unlikely that the Court would extend this principle to protect against
the mere initiation of an investigation.
2. Right to Choice of Counsel
Once defendants' due process rights do attach, however, they may
receive associated protections of their right to counsel. The Court has
suggested that it is "fundamental" under due process that "a defen-
dant is not to be denied the privilege of representation by counsel of
his choice."1 30 Accordingly, the Court in Commissioner v. Tellier used
due process to bar an agency from burdening a defendant's payment
of attorneys' fees, rejecting an IRS argument that an individual could
not deduct legal expenses (which he had incurred defending a prose-
126 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (requiring due process for suspen-
sions from school).
127 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 434, 437 (1971) (rejecting a state
practice of posting a notice that an individual could not purchase alcohol when she
had engaged in "excessive drinking"); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972) (finding that since an employee's reputation was not impugned by his state
employer, his liberty interests were not infringed when the employer fired him).
:2 Albrightv. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 296 (1994) (StevensJ., dissenting).
29 424 U.S. 693, 697, 701 (1976); see also Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538
U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (rejecting a claim that disclosure of the identities of sexual offenders
under Connecticut's Megan's Law impairs a liberty interest and triggers due process
protections); cf Albright, 510 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion) (declining to recognize a
due process violation when a criminal defendant was prosecuted without probable
cause); id. at 296 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "commencement of a
criminal prosecution.., certainly" infringes liberty interests by causing reputational
harm).
130 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 468 (1942), overruled on other grounds &y Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339, 344 (1963).
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cution under the Securities Act) from his income tax payments. The
Court there noted that "[n]o public policy is offended when a man
faced with serious criminal charges employs a lawyer... [because in]
an adversary system of criminal justice, it is a basic of our public policy
that a defendant in a criminal case have counsel to represent him.
131
Yet this principle does not extend as far as it initially appears, and
it is not clear that it would actually constrain the McNulty Memoran-
dum. In Department of Labor v. Triplett,132 a later case evaluating statu-
tory limitations on attorneys' fees, the Court set a high standard for
finding a due process violation. Although the Court recognized that a
"restriction upon the fees a lawyer may charge" might "deprive[] the
lawyer's prospective client of a due process right to obtain legal repre-
sentation," 13 this was not enough. Rather, the Court required the
plaintiffs to show both that they "could not obtain representation" and




Under this higher standard, the due process right to choice of
counsel is unlikely to provide reliable protection from the McNulty
Memorandum.' 35 Few defendants could make the showing required
by Triplett. First, the typical effect of the policy is not to deny individu-
als access to any lawyers at all, but merely to restrict the number of
lawyers available to them. Second, given that explicit statutory restric-
tions on attorneys' fees were insufficient to trigger the Court's protec-
tion, it seems unlikely that the more oblique operation of the McNulty
Memorandum would do so (even though it might implicitly cap attor-
neys' fee payments by constraining an employee's access to indemnifi-
cation). Nor would Tellier afford relief: 136 First, the relatively indirect
operation of the McNulty Memorandum does not rise to the level of
the IRS action in Tellier. Second, whereas the IRS decision appeared
to the Court to be inconsistent with congressional action on tax pol-
icy, the DOJ is arguably just exercising its prosecutorial discretion in
an area that, thus far at least, Congress has left alone.
131 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966).
,32 U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990).
33 Id. at 720.
134 Id. at 722.
135 Nor would it protect defendants if the SEC were to adopt a similar policy.
136 It is also telling that the Court never again relied on Tellier for this proposition.
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3. Right to Adequate Representation
Due process also incorporates the right to adequate representation
as a "necessary corollary" of the right to counsel. 13 This requires that a
defendant "be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult
with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of
little worth." 138 A defendant therefore has a due process right to have
"the assistance of zealous and earnest counsel"' 39 and "to have sufficient
time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense."
140
DOJ policy may violate this right in two ways. First, it introduces a
conflict of interest into an employee's relationship with her attorney-
a conflict that could deprive the employee of her due process right to
"zealous and earnest counsel." In light of the DOJ's position on co-
operation, a company may be forced to choose between its own sur-
vival and payment of an employee's legal expenses. Since the com-
pany is likely to insist that an employee "cooperate" with the
government to receive indemnification, the attorney's continued
compensation may be in jeopardy. The attorney is thus forced into a
conflict: If she advises the employee to resist the government's de-
mands, she risks forcing the employee to seek other, more affordable
representation. If she advises the employee to cooperate, on the
other hand, she can be better assured of continued payment via the
company. The conflict between the employer's and employee's inter-
ests would essentially infect the attorney-client relationship, 14' depriv-
ing the defendant of "zealous and earnest counsel" and amounting to
a due process violation. Yet this may not always be true. For instance,
if a court finds that the employee was correctly advised to cooperate-
and that often is the best solution in government investigations-the
court may be reluctant to find that this conflict amounts to a due
137 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954).
138 Id.; see also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (holding that a
criminal defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel during trial).
139 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 450 (1940).
140 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,59 (1932).
141 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134(1)
(2000) ("A lawyer may not represent a client if someone other than the client will
wholly or partly compensate the lawyer for the representation, unless the client con-
sents. . . ."); see also id. § 125 ("Unless the affected client consents ... , a lawyer may
not represent a client if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of
the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's financial or other
personal interests.").
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process violation. As a result, this aspect of due process protection
would not provide a sufficient guard against government interference.
The McNulty Memorandum may still violate the adequate repre-
sentation right in a second way, by essentially forcing a defendant to
change counsel at a stage in the litigation that would impact the de-
fendant's ability "to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and
prepare his defense." 142 That is, by causing a defendant's funding for
attorneys' fees to be terminated, the government might force a defen-
dant to find a cheaper attorney-one she can afford on her own. If
this change occurred at an inopportune stage in the litigation, it
could hinder the defendant's ability to prepare for trial. At the ex-
treme, if the government forces an employer to cut off an employee's
entitlement to indemnification during or on the eve of trial, it seems
clear that the government would be violating the employee's due
process rights. But that situation seems unlikely.
What is more likely is that funding would stop upon indictment-
as happened in Stein143 --or at some time between indictment and trial
as a result of continued negotiations with the company. While this
seems unfair, it is not clear that suspending funding under such cir-
cumstances would be barred by due process considerations. The de-
fendant could still have sufficient time to prepare her defense, and as
long as the period between the retention of counsel and a proceeding




The Sixth Amendment might seem to offer better protection.
Even to the extent that DOJ policy does not violate due process, it may
violate the Sixth Amendment's grant to a criminal defendant of a
right "to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." 145 Sixth
Amendment rights invoke issues similar to those raised by due proc-
ess, but the Sixth Amendment standard is arguably much more de-
142 Powell, 287 U.S. at 59.
143 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 345-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
144 See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 590 (1964) (considering the availability of
evidence and the complexity of the legal claims in assessing whether five days was "a
constitutionally inadequate time to hire counsel and prepare a defense").
145 U.S. CONST. amend. V]; see a/soJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938)
(holding that the "Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime
to the assistance of counsel," and that a violation of this right "stands as ajurisdictional
bar" to the imposition of sentences).
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manding of the government. 14 There are two salient components of
this right: the right to the effective assistance of counsel and the fight
to representation by counsel of one's choice.
Before defendants can avail themselves of these guarantees, how-
ever, they must meet two important threshold conditions, which can
be difficult in white-collar cases. Since Sixth Amendment rights only
apply in criminal actions, they do not protect defendants against civil
actions by the SEC, DOJ, or other agencies. 147 Similarly, the Sixth
Amendment applies only to the postindictment context, thus limiting
its usefulness against applications of the McNulty Memorandum dur-
ing investigations.
1. The Attachment of Sixth Amendment Rights
Sixth Amendment rights attach only upon "the initiation of adver-
sary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."
48
This impedes defendants' efforts to invoke the Sixth Amendment to
challenge government conduct that occurs during investigations. As
one observer has noted, it can be difficult to map "the lawyer of Gideon
and Strickland" onto white-collar investigations, in large part because
"she arrives much earlier" than the attorney envisioned by traditional
principles of criminal procedure. 149
Nonetheless, some lower courts have recognized an exception to
this principle. For instance, the Seventh Circuit has noted that "the
right to counsel presumptively does not attach" before indictment, but
that this presumption could be rebutted by a showing that the gov-
ernment had informally "crossed the constitutionally significant divide
from fact-finder to adversary."150 It is conceivable that this exception
could help some defendants, but it could not be utilized in the many
146 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006) (rejecting an
argument that the demands of due process and the Sixth Amendment are the same).
147 See, e.g., Elliott v. SEC, 36 F.3d 86, 88 (lth Cir. 1994) (denying a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in administrative proceedings); FIC v. World Wide Fac-
tors, Ltd., 882 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying a Sixth Amendment fight to
counsel in a civil action by a federal agency).
148 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); see also United States v. Gouveia, 467
U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (reviewing cases affirming this principle).
149 See Buell, supra note 33, at 1630.
150 United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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instances where the government secures the company's cooperation
before deciding which employees to charge.
The Stein court took an even more generous approach, summarily
carving out an exception where the government's preindictment ac-
tions would create "an unconstitutional effect upon indictment."15
Such an analysis has two flaws. First, it is inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court's reluctance to allow the Sixth Amendment "to wrap a
protective cloak around the attorney-client relationship for its own
sake," since "[b]y its very terms, [the Amendment] becomes applica-
ble only when the government's role shifts from investigation to accu-
sation."15 2 Second, it rests on a blanket assumption that the govern-
ment's actions will have a postindictment effect that is
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. As will be discussed in
the remainder of this Section, such an assumption is unrealistic under
Sixth Amendment case law.
2. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The right to "assistance of counsel" implies a requirement that the
"assistance" be effective. The Court has established two pathways to
an ineffective assistance claim. In Strickland v. Washington, the Court
formulated the primary standard for ineffective assistance, requiring
defendants to show both ineffectiveness and prejudice. It described
the meaning of "effective" in various ways: that the representation
meet "an objective standard of reasonableness," 54 that the attorney
"fulfill the role in the adversary process that the [Sixth] Amendment
envisions," 155 and that the attorney exercise "reasonable professional
151 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia followed Stein's lead in another case challenging the Thompson Memo-
randum's fee provisions. The court accepted the argument about postindictment effects
on the ground that doing otherwise "would leave important interests unserved":
"[s] imply because there is no right to appointed counsel at a particular stage of an in-
vestigation, it does not follow that the government has carte blanche to interfere in pre-
existing attorney-client relationships at that stage." United States v. Rosen, 487 F.
Supp. 2d 721, 733-34 (E.D. Va. 2007).
152 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986).
153 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 344 (1980); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) ("[A] party whose
counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in no better position than one
who has no counsel at all.").
154 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
155 Id.
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judgment. " 156 It also required that courts "be highly deferential" in
evaluating the quality of representation. 151 In addition to showing that
the representation was ineffective, a defendant making an ineffective
assistance claim must show prejudice, which requires errors so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair and reliable trial. In most cases,
the defendant must establish a "reasonable probability" that the out-
come of the trial would have been different if the representation had
been effective. 158
It seems unlikely that a defendant stymied by indemnification re-
strictions could meet this standard. A new attorney could still meet
"an objective standard of reasonableness,"' 59 "fulfill the role in the ad-
versary process that the [Sixth] Amendment envisions,"'' l6 and exer-
cise "reasonable professional judgment," 16 1 despite being retained at
an inconvenient time or being relatively inexperienced. And even if
the representation were "ineffective," it would not necessarily be so se-
vere as to prejudice the defendant by causing a different outcome at
trial. 162 Strickland thus does not provide a reliable source of protection
from the McNulty Memorandum.
63
Alternatively, the circumstances of trial preparation could justify a
"presumption of ineffectiveness," and thus of a Sixth Amendment viola-
tion, "without inquiry into [counsel's] actual performance at trial.' 6"
This presumption is triggered when it would be "unreasonable" in light
of the complexity of the case "to expect that counsel could adequately
156 Id. at 690.
157 Id. at 689.
158 Id. at 695.
159 Id. at 688.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 690.
162 See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REv. 1, 3 ("Even if Monday-morning quarter-
backing helps to satisfy the first prong [of Strickland], the air of inevitability and the
confirmatory bias make it hard to satisfy the second."); id. at II (arguing that "tradi-
tional Strickland review has no teeth").
163 See Buell, supra note 33, at 1650-51 ("The Sixth Amendment promises no par-
ticular quantity of resources; the question is simply whether some counsel has been pro-
vided and whether that counsel was able to perform 'effectively' under a standard of ex
post review that excuses all manner of deficient lawyering. The importance or com-
plexity of a case certainly drives up defense costs, but it does not have much impact on
what the Constitution guarantees.... The effective assistance doctrine thus turns out
to be mostly inapplicable to the setting of the organizational criminal case.").
164 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661 (1984).
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prepare for trial during [the available] period of time."16' But the stan-
dard is high, since "[n]ot every restriction on counsel's time or opportu-
nity to investigate or to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for
trial violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."'66 More-
over, the mere fact that an attorney is inexperienced (as might be the
case when an employee must pay for counsel on her own) does not give
rise to a presumption of ineffectiveness.167 Conceivably, the government
could intervene at such a critical stage of trial preparation that a pre-
sumption of ineffectiveness would be warranted. But since the Court has
noted that inexperience of counsel and limitations on trial preparation
time are insufficient tojustify a presumption of ineffectiveness, this claim
also seems unlikely to succeed.
Nonetheless, there are two more ways for a defendant to establish
a Sixth Amendment violation without showing prejudice. First, she
could demonstrate that the state impeded her attorney's ability to ad-
vise her."" However, some state intrusions into the relationship are
allowable, especially when the Court finds such intrusions necessary to
effective law enforcement investigations. For instance, in one case the
Court found that the government had not infringed the Sixth
Amendment by allowing its informant to attend a meeting between a
defendant and his attorney. In approving this practice, the Court re-
ferred to the "necessity" of the practice and its "value ... to effective
law enforcement."' 69 Similarly, the law enforcement interests asserted
by the government in the context of the McNulty Memorandum
would probably outweigh the comparatively small intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship.
165 Id.; see also id. at 664-65 (considering the preparation time in light of the acces-
sibility of evidence, the nature of the charges against the defendant, and the existence
of factual disputes).
166 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983).
,67 See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665 ("[A] particular lawyer's experience.., does not jus-
tify a presumption of ineffectiveness ....").
,68 See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) ("Our cases have...
been responsive to proved claims that governmental conduct has rendered counsel's
assistance to the defendant ineffective."); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91
(1976) (finding impermissible an order preventing attorney-client consultations dur-
ing trial); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975) ("[T]he right to the assis-
tance of counsel has been understood to mean that there can be no restrictions upon
the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the tradi-
tions of the adversary factfinding process . ").
'69 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1977). In Weatherford, the informant
was invited to the attorney-client meeting by the defendant, and the informant did not
communicate privileged details of the meeting to the government. Id. at 558.
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Second, a defendant might be able to show that an attorney's con-
flict of interest deprived her of effective representation if the conflict
"adversely affected [the] lawyer's performance" so as to "impermissi-
bly imperil [the defendant's] right to a fair trial."17 ° Although a de-
fendant making such a claim would not need to show prejudice, she
would need to show that the conflict "actually affected the adequacy
of his representation."1 7 ' As discussed with regard to the analogous
due process claim, the attorney's reliance on the defendant's em-
ployer for payment could create a conflict between the attorney's and
the defendant's interests. But since representation in the white-
collar context often entails advising a defendant to cooperate with the
government, a defendant may receive the same advice from an attor-
ney with a conflict as from an attorney without a conflict-a situation
that would undercut the claim of an "actual" effect.
3. Right to Choice of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment also protects a defendant from govern-
ment interference with her choice of counsel. The Court recently
held in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez that the "right to select counsel
of one's choice" is in fact "the root meaning of [this] constitutional
guarantee. 17 3 Consequently, if the state prevents "the accused [from
being] defended by the counsel he believes to be best," the Sixth
Amendment is violated, and "[n]o additional showing of prejudice is
required to make the violation 'complete."1 74 Rather than being re-
viewed for harmless error, violation of this aspect of the Sixth
Amendment right is so severe as to constitute structural error and
thus require reversal. 175
Yet there are important limitations on this protection. For in-
stance, a defendant does not have a right to hire an attorney with a
176
conflict of interest (even if the defendant waives the conflict), or to
170 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 484-85 (1978) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942)).
171 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50.
172 See supra Part II.A.3.
173 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2563 (2006).
174 Id. at 2562.
175 Id. at 2564-65.
176 See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-60 (1988) ("[A] defendant [may
not] insist on the counsel of an attorney who has a previous or ongoing relationship
with an opposing party ... "); see also id. at 159 (noting that counsel must be a mem-
ber of the bar).
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request certain counsel in bad faith to delay proceedings. 7 7 "Thus,
while the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attor-
ney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, [its] essential aim...
is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant
rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented
by the lawyer whom he prefers."
178
Critical to the indemnification context, the Court has also held
that "a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he
cannot afford or who for other reasons declines to represent the de-
fendant."1 79 In Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, the Court upheld a
federal forfeiture statute against a challenge that it infringed a defen-
dant's right to hire counsel of his choice.' 8° Pursuant to the statute,
the DOJ had convinced the district court to freeze assets of the defen-
dant, Christopher Reckmeyer. Despite the asset freeze, Reckmeyer
retained the law firm of Caplin & Drysdale to represent him, expect-
ing to rely on some of the assets as payment. After he entered a plea
agreement and agreed to forfeit the assets, Caplin & Drysdale peti-
tioned for $195,000 of the forfeited funds as compensation for its ser-
vices and eventually challenged the statute's constitutionality (nomi-
nally on Reckmeyer's behalf).'s'
Although the Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment pro-
tected a right to choice of counsel, it held that this right did not ex-
tend past what the defendant could afford. 182 The Court even went so
far as to say that a "defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend
another person's money for services rendered by an attorney, even if
those funds are the only way that that defendant will be able to retain
the attorney of his choice."183 Caplin & Drysdale therefore appears to
deny defendants Sixth Amendment protection from the McNulty
Memorandum. That is, the DOJ can pressure a company to withhold
indemnification of its employees, even if that prevents the employee
from being "defended by the counsel he believes to be best." 84 There
177 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).
178 Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
179 Id.
180 Caplin & Drysdale, Chtd. v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25, 635 (1989).
181 Id. at 619-21, 623-24 n.3.
182 Id. at 624-26.
183 Id. at 626. Of course, if the government's action causes a defendant to have
insufficient funds to hire any attorney, that would trigger the defendant's right to ap-
pointed counsel. Id. at 624-25; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(requiring appointment of counsel for criminal defendants who cannot afford it).
184 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006).
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would be no Sixth Amendment violation, since there is "no Sixth
Amendment right to spend another person's money for services ren-
dered by an attorney."'8 5
It could be argued that Caplin & Drysdale does not actually reach
this far. Although the decision referred to "another person's money,"
that language glossed over an important nuance: under forfeiture
law, the government had asserted a property interest in the funds, 86
and Rechmeyer had conceded it.8 7 Since the forfeited funds never
legally belonged to Rechmeyer, he had no Sixth Amendment right to
spend it on a lawyer. By contrast, an employee entitled to indemnifi-
cation arguably has a greater property interest in the attorneys' fee
funding than someone like Rechmeyer, who had obtained the money
through illegal narcotics sales. Assuming that the employee is entitled
to the funds, she may therefore be protected by the Sixth Amendment
from government intervention. Coupled with the Gonzalez-Lopez
Court's recent elevation of the right to choice of counsel from being
merely "comprehended by the Sixth Amendment"'8 to being its "root
meaning,"8 9 this narrower reading of Caplin & Drysdale would suggest
the existence of stronger Sixth Amendment protections.
This view seems overly optimistic. First, the DOJ has denied any
intent to interfere with legally binding indemnification requirements.
Its indemnification policy applies (at least on its face) only when the
money for attorneys' fees legally belongs to the company, not the em-
ployee. The situation is thus similar to the forfeiture scenario, where
the funds belonged to the government, not the defendant. Second,
although the Gonzalez-Lopez Court spoke in strong language about the
right to choice of counsel, in that case state procedural rules had di-
rectly interfered with a defendant's attempt to retain a specific lawyer
by preventing the lawyer's pro hac vice admission.' 90 The Stein court,
finding that the DOJ had "forced [the defendants] to limit their de-
fenses.., for economic reasons,"'9' apparently viewed the DOJ's ac-
tions in the same light as the state rules in Gonzalez-Lopez. In reality,
185 See Caplin &Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626.
186 See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (f) (2000) ("All right, title, and interest in property [subject
to forfeiture] ... shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise
to forfeiture under this section.").
18 Caplin &Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 621.
88 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
189 Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563.
190 Id. at 2560-61.
191 United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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however, the operation of the McNulty Memorandum is more circum-
spect; rather than directly constraining an employee's choice of coun-
sel, it discourages companies from using their discretion to finance
the employee's choice of counsel.' 92 As others have noted, "[t]he con-
troversy... is not.., whether a firm's agent may spend her own funds
on her defense, but rather... whether the firm's funds may be de-
ployed for the agent's defense." 9 3 Caplin & Drysdale therefore seems
more apposite than Gonzalez-Lopez. Viewed under that framework, the
Sixth Amendment is not a strong bulwark against the force of the
McNulty Memorandum.
C. Substantive Due Process
In the absence of adequate protection from the Sixth Amendment
and procedural due process, it is tempting to turn to substantive due
process to protect defendants' right to counsel. Recognizing a substan-
tive due process right in this area would subject the McNulty Memoran-
dum to demanding standards-and might very well prove fatal to the pol-
icy. Indeed, Stein took this road to find the Thompson Memorandum
unconstitutional. But when properly applied, substantive due process is
not an appropriate repository for the right to counsel.
1. Use of the Glucksberg Analysis
Stein relied on the Glucksberg analysis to assess the substantive due
process implications of the Thompson Memorandum. Glucksberg had
been announced nearly a decade earlier in the context of a statute
barring assisted suicide. Yet even if one accepts the use of Glucksberg
to evaluate executive action (an assumption that itself seems inconsis-
tent with the case law 4), this argument fails. Noting that due process
"guarantees more than fair process," 95 the Glucksberg Court declared
that to be protected under substantive due process, an asserted right
192 Indeed, prosecutors' power in the forfeiture context is similar to their power in
constraining indemnification. See David Rudovsky, The Right to Counsel Under Attack,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1969 (1988) (describing forfeiture proceedings as allowing
"the prosecution [to] preclude any criminal defendant from retaining counsel of
choice").
193 Buell, supra note 33, at 1651; see also Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate
Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts (pt. II), 7 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L.J. 2 (2006), http://bj.ucdavis.edu/article.asp?id=650 (arguing that Stein's in-
terpretation of the right to choice of counsel was too generous).
:94 See infra Part II.C.2.
95 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
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must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."0 6 But
before conducting this analysis, the right must be "careful[ly] de-
scri[bed]." 97 If an asserted right is found to be protected under sub-
stantive due process, governmental action infringing it must be "nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 198 If not, the action
must merely be "rationally related to legitimate government inter-
ests." 199
The threshold inquiry under Glucksberg is therefore to define what
interest is actually being protected. The Stein court identified the in-
terest at issue as a defendant's right "to obtain and use in order to
prepare a defense resources lawfully available to him or her, free of
,,200knowing or reckless government interference. If this were an ap-
propriate interest under Glucksberg, it would seem unassailable-such
a right is surely "deeply rooted." But this interest is framed too
broadly to be consistent with the Court's requirement that the interest
be "carefully described."2 0 ' A more appropriate statement of the right
at issue would be "the right to indemnification of attorneys' fees by
one's employer." Framed this way, the right is not "deeply rooted," as
Stein suggests. The common law did not encourage such indemnifica-
tion;2°2 rather, it is the result of modern statutes and corporate prac-
tice. Under this more faithful interpretation of the Glucksberg substan-
196 Id. at 720-21 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
The Court has applied a similar requirement to determine whether to protect rights
related to family relationships. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)
(plurality opinion) (noting that "the interest of parents in the care, custody, and con-
trol of their children.., is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests rec-
ognized by this Court"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (emphasizing that to be protected under substantive due process, a liberty
interest must be both fundamental and "traditionally protected by our society").
197 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
98 Id. Although some commentators claimed that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), announced a new, less restrictive approach to substantive due process doc-
trine, this may have been overly optimistic. See Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg
Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 425-
26 (2006) (determining, based on a review of over one hundred post-Lawrence cases,
that "every element" of Glucksberg's methodology "remains alive and well").
199 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
200 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
201 The Stein court also alluded to the potential existence of a substantive due
process "right to fairness in criminal proceedings," but denied that it was going so far
as to hold that such a right exists. Id. at 361. This characterization of the right would
be objectionable for the same reason.
See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 17, at 1068-69 ("[T]he common law governing a
director's right to indemnification for costs of litigation is a welter of confusion.").
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tive due process analysis, it seems unlikely that the McNulty Memo-
randum amounts to a substantive due process violation.
2. Evaluation of Executive Actions
Yet Glucksberg may not even be the proper framework in which to
evaluate the McNulty Memorandum. Even after Glucksberg, the Court
has continued to evaluate executive actions (such as prosecutorial ac-
tions by an executive agency like the DOJ) using a different stan-
dard,0 2 since the "criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary [under
substantive due process] differ depending on whether it is legislation
or a specific act of a governmental officer that is at issue. 2 4 The stan-
dard for executive actions was initially described as prohibiting gov-
ernment conduct that "shocks the conscience",2 5 or infringes rights
that are the "essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.,2 °6 Despite the
high threshold set by these early characterizations of the substantive
due process right, "the core of the concept [is] protection against ar-
bitrary action.2 0 7 That is, substantive due process "bar[s] certain gov-
ernment actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them."0 8
In the context of executive action, "only the most egregious offi-
cial conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the constitutional
sense,'"' 20 9 since "the Due Process Clause was intended to prevent gov-
ernment officials from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an
203 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998).
204 Id. at 846. A notable exception to this practice may be Reno v. F/ores, 507 U.S.
292 (1993), which employed a Glucksberg-type analysis to evaluate a challenge to an
agency regulation promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The Stein
court argued that Glucksberg applies because the "Thompson Memorandum in sub-
stance was a regulation," and was therefore legislative in nature. United States v. Stein,
495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Although it seems reasonable to treat the product of formal rulemaking as inher-
ently legislative, the McNulty Memorandum is more like routine executive action since
it was more informally developed and is more flexibly applied. Cf United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233-34 (2001) (distinguishing notice-and-comment rule-
making from more informal agency rulings). In any event, the claim of a substantive
due process violation is weak under either Glucksbergor Lewis.
205 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
206 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
207 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845.
208 Id. at 840 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
209 Id. at 846 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
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instrument of oppression."210 Unlike when evaluating legislation,
when evaluating executive action a court must first ask whether the
conduct is "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to
shock the contemporary conscience." 21  Although that initial inquiry
can "be informed by a history of liberty protection," its primary focus
is "an understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contempo-
rary practice, and of the standards of blame generally applied to
them." 212 An action is certainly conscience-shocking if an official "in-
tend[s] to injure" an individual without justification by a government
interest, but it is a "closer call[]" if an officer is merely reckless or
grossly negligent in assessing the consequences of her conduct.
2 13
Despite the unfairness of government interference with reim-
bursement of defendants' legal expenses, it does not reach the level of
shocking the conscience. Although constraints on indemnification
might reflect a disregard for the right to counsel, it seems excessive to
view them as intentional injury to individuals. DOJ officials do not
appear to be trying to harm potential defendants in the sense that
they are "abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression. ' '2 4  Even characterizing the indemnification policy as
reckless or grossly negligent, and therefore within the "closer call[]"
215
territory identified by the Court, seems to be inaccurate for the ma-
jority of cases. Even if the conduct were reckless, however, it is still
unlikely that it would amount to a substantive due process violation
since the Court has rejected such claims even when government ac-
tions may have resulted in human deaths. 2 6 Despite the sanctity of
the right to counsel, it would be a stretch to say that it competes with
the interest in life. At most, it seems that courts would find that the
policy "shocks the conscience" only in situations like that in Stein,
where prosecutors regularly asked the company to rescind individual
210 Id. at 840 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
211 Id. at 848 n.8.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 849; see also Collins, 503 U.S. at 126-28 (rejecting a claim premised on a
city's "deliberate indifference" to its employees); DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989) (rejecting a claim that the govern-
ment had a substantive due process obligation to protect individuals "from each
other").
214 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215 See id. at 849.
216 See, e.g., id.; Collins, 503 U.S. at 128.
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employees' indemnification rights.2 7 If prosecutors used more deli-
cate tactics, as seems likely under the terms of the McNulty Memoran-
2181dum, there would be much less room to find the conduct con-
science-shocking.
In addition, the Court is generally reluctant to recognize a sub-
stantive due process right when another constitutional protection
could suffice. When another constitutional provision "provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against" the chal-
lenged conduct, it is that guarantee, "not the more generalized notion
of 'substantive due process,' [that] must be the guide for analyzing
these claims. ' '2 9 Here, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide ex-
plicit sources of constitutional protection. Admittedly, the protection
they provide is far from perfect. But that is not the standard-the
textual protections need not protect every individual for the Court to
decline to recognize substantive due process rights.
III. ACCESS TO THE COURTS
In light of the deficiencies of due process and the Sixth Amend-
ment, the access-to-courts doctrine would provide better protection
for employees to receive indemnification for legal expenses without
DOJ interference. The doctrine holds that when the government in-
trudes on individuals' access to legal advice, it must have a compelling
reason for doing so. 22' By analyzing the McNulty Memorandum under
this doctrine, it is possible to identify the constitutional deficiencies of
DOJ policy while avoiding the roadblocks presented by due process
and the Sixth Amendment.
A. The Right of Access to the Courts
In essence, the right of access to the courts entitles litigants to le-
gal advice free of government intervention-that is, a right to avoid
"systemic official action" that "frustrates" a litigant's ability to use the
217 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (describing the ongoing commu-
nications between KPMG and prosecutors about the level of cooperation offered by
KPMG employees).
21 See supra text accompanying note 48.
219 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
220 See supra Part I .A-B.
221 See In rePrimus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978).
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courts to vindicate her rights.: Despite the characterization of the
right as "access to the courts," it "extends to all departments of the
Government," and can therefore encompass interactions with admin-
223istrative agencies rather than just litigation in the courts.
The Court recently described the right in the context of legal ser-
224vices funding in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez. The Court's core
concern was that governmental action could result in "two tiers of
cases": cases where litigants received representation free of govern-
mental intrusion and those where governmental intervention had re-
sulted in "truncated representation" that deprived litigants of their
entitlement to "complete analysis of the case, full advice to the client,
and proper presentation to the court."
225
The right of access to the courts is "grounded... in the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment Petition
Clause, [and] the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 2 6 Because
it derives from First Amendment rights, it applies even when there is
ultimately no deprivation of life, liberty, or property (unlike due
process), and applies even when a criminal trial is not envisioned
(unlike the Sixth Amendment).
The government can constitutionally infringe on the right of ac-
cess to the courts only if its actions survive scrutiny under a compel-
ling interest standard. That is, "only a compelling state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regu-
late can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms. ",2 7 The interest
must be strong enough to "subordinat[e]" the rights of litigants, and
the regulation must be "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridg-
2281ment" of these rights.
222 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002).
223 Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972).
24 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
25 Id. at 546. Although Legal Services focused on a different context--conditions
imposed by Congress on its funding for Legal Services Corporation, which provides
legal services to indigents-the core values of the decision are still relevant.
226 Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415 n.12 (citations omitted). This discussion does not ad-
dress the Fourteenth Amendment and equal protection roots of the doctrine. For a
helpful examination of the use of the access-to-courts doctrine in a different context,
see Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and
Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 547, 565-76 (2002).
227 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
28 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25
(1976)).
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B. Development of the Right
Modem use of the access-to-courts doctrine to protect the right to
counsel arose in the 1960s as an effort to safeguard the ights of mi-
norities and union members. This line of cases began with NAACP v.
Button, in which the Court struck down a Virginia regulation that pre-
vented lawyers working under the auspices of the NAACP from con-
tacting potential litigants. 229 The effect of this regulation was to im-
pose criminal liability on "a person who advises another that his legal
rights have been infringed and refers him to a particular attorney," as
well as on "the attorney who knowingly renders assistance under such
circumstances."23 ° In holding that "the First Amendment... protects
vigorous advocacy ... against governmental intrusion,"23 the Court
noted several aspects of the attorney-client relationship that are also
applicable to the indemnification context. First, the NAACP deter-
mined whether the litigant was entitled to the organization's assis-
tance. Second, if a litigant was deemed eligible, the NAACP selected
and retained the attorney and then paid for "all expenses of litiga-
tion. Third, the attorneys did not "receive[] a salary or retainer
233
from the NAACP," but were paid for their services on specific cases.
Finally, "[t]he actual conduct of assisted litigation [was] under the
control of the attorney, although the NAACP continue[d] to be con-
cerned that the outcome of the lawsuit should be consistent with" its
interests.2 4 The same features characterize companies' retention of
attorneys for their employees today.
The next year, the Court in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vir-
ginia extended Button to a new context-assistance provided by unions
to help their members prosecute worker's compensation claims.235
The Court interpreted Button as standing for the broad proposition
that "in regulating the practice of law a State cannot ignore the rights
29 371 U.S. at 444. For reviews of the development of the access-to-court doctrine
since Button, see Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 563-89 (1999), andJulie M.
Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right To Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances:
Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 43-49 (1993).
23o Id. at 434.
231 Id. at 429.
232 Id. at 420.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 421.
235 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
2007]
536 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW
of individuals secured by the Constitution. 2 6 Although Button had
appeared to be premised on the special nature of equal rights litiga-
tion, 2 3  Trainmen instead based the right on the concern raised in
Gideon v. Wainwright that "[llaymen cannot be expected to know how
to protect their rights when dealing with practiced and carefully coun-
seled adversaries. 23 8 "The right to petition the courts" thus incorpo-
rated the rights both to use "the courts to vindicate.., legal rights"
and to "advise one another."23 9 The Court found the state's attempt to
control this form of legal representation objectionable even despite
the union's history of requiring a kickback of attorneys' fees and in-
fluencing the outcomes of certain cases.240 Even a commendable de-
sire to protect potential litigants thus could not justify the govern-
ment's actions. A few years later, the Court reaffirmed that unions
have "the right to hire attorneys. .. to assist [their] members in the
assertion of their legal rights. '2 4' The state therefore could not consti-
tutionally restrict the union program on the basis that it "constitute [s]
the unauthorized practice of law."
2 42
The Court later characterized this principle in the following man-
ner: "collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the
courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment," but this "right would be a hollow promise if courts
could deny [organizations] the means of enabling their members to
meet the costs of legal representation." 43 In doing so, the Court• • • 244
struck down an injunction that would have violated this right in two
ways that are salient to the indemnification context-by preventing
236 Id. at 6.
237 See Button, 371 U.S. at 431 (noting that "association for litigation may be the
most effective form of political association" for NAACP-funded litigants).
238 Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 7 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); see
also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (re-
jecting the argument "that the principles announced in Button were applicable only to
litigation for political purposes"); Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys'Fees Under RICO
and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How To Avoid
It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 765, 829-30 (1989) (arguing that the access-to-courts doctrine is
"not limited to political speech" and could be used to protect access to counsel when
forfeiture has impeded a defendant's ability to pay for an attorney).
239 Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 7.
240 Id. at 9 (Clark,J, dissenting).
241 United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 221-22.
242 Id. at 218.
243 United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971).
244 Id. at 586.
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the union from "employ[ing] counsel to represent its members"2 45
and by limiting the fees charged by attorneys it hired or recom-
mended. 46
In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court then extended the doctrine to
protect divorce litigants trying to exercise fundamental rights in the
"only forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes." 247 Al-
though Boddie explicitly limited its holding to the matter at issue, 248
this language does suggest a broader view that the access-to-courts
doctrine applies in other situations where governmental restrictions
limit the ability to use the courts to vindicate fundamental rights. In-
deed, the Court later characterized Boddie as protecting family rights
because they are "ranked as 'of basic importance in our society"' and
are constitutionally protected "against the State's unwarranted usurpa-
tion, disregard, or disrespect."2 49 On the other hand, Boddie does not
protect litigants in proceedings that the Court does not believe impli-
250cate fundamental interests, such as bankruptcy cases and welfare
251
appeals.
In a similar vein, the doctrine has been applied to protect prison-
ers' access to the courts. In this context, the right "assures that no
person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary alle-
gations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights
2 52
• • 253
related to the fact or conditions of their imprisonment. Accord-
ingly, despite the deference that the courts usually afford prison ad-
ministrators, prisons must meet a high standard before burdening
245 Id. at 581.
246 Id. at 584.
247 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
248 Id. at 382.
249 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (quoting Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376).
250 See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973) (holding that the interest
in eliminating debts "does not rise to the same constitutional level" as the "freedom to
pursue ... protected associational activities" at issue in Boddie).
251 See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that an
interest in increased welfare payments is of "far less constitutional significance" than
the interest in Boddie).
252 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); see also Kreimer & Rudovsky, su-
pra note 226, at 565 (referring to this guarantee as a "deeply rooted constitutional
norm").
253 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (requiring that prisoners be
provided the tools to challenge conditions of their confinement); Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (rejecting restrictions on prisoners providing legal assistance
to each other); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) ("[T]he state... may not
abridge or impair [a prisoner's] right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus.").
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prisoners' ability to consult legal resources in preparing section
1983254 complaints or habeas petitions. 5  Moreover, prisons must af-
firmatively ensure that "inmate access to the courts is adequate, effec-
tive, and meaningful."2 56 This right has been applied to allow prison-
ers access to legal assistance, such as "adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, although not
2,58necessarily to appointed counsel .
254 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a cause of action against government offi-
cials for civil rights violations).
255 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974)
("[P]risoners [must] be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful
convictions and to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. This means
that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of
attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of pro-
fessional representation or other aspects of the right of access to the courts are inva-
lid."), rev'd on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
256 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977). The government's affirmative obli-
gations are, nonetheless, rather limited: "the access doctrine is not about assisting the
petitioner in developing the best possible petition; instead, it is about (1) removing
government-imposed hurdles that directly interfere with the petitioner's ability to pre-
pare and properly file the petition, and (2) providing only the minimal help necessary
to facilitate such access." Celestine Richards McConville, The Meaninglessness of Delayed
Appointments and Discretionary Grants of Capital Postconviction Counse 42 TULSA L. REV.
253, 262 (2006) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
257 Id. at 828; see also Procunier, 416 U.S. at 419 (striking down a restriction on assis-
tance by law students and paralegals); Avery, 393 U.S. at 490 (striking down a regula-
tion that barred prisoners from providing legal assistance to each other, since it effec-
tively prevented illiterate and uneducated prisoners from filing habeas petitions).
"" See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding that prison-
ers have no right to appointed counsel for collateral review of convictions); Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (holding that prisoners have no right to appointed
counsel for discretionary appeals). The right of prisoners to seek legal advice has been
a focus of the lower federal courts' access-to-courts jurisprudence, although they have
recognized that it extends beyond the context of prisoner litigation. See, e.g., Snyder v.
Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 291 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The right of access to the courts is the right
of an individual, whether free or incarcerated, to obtain access to the courts without
undue interference."); Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 92 & n.8 (2d Cir. 2004)
(recognizing the right of access to courts, and noting that although it "applies beyond
criminal litigation," it "has particular application to prisoners"); see also White v.
Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a prisoner can make an
access-to-courts claim by demonstrating that "the state has not provided an opportunity
to litigate a claim challenging the prisoner's sentence or conditions of confinement in
a court of law"); Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006) ("To guarantee
prisoners their constitutional right of access to the courts, prison authorities are re-
quired to provide prisoners with adequate law libraries or legally trained assistance to
prepare and file meaningful legal papers."), amended by 459 F.3d 1310 (11 th Cir. 2006);
Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an access-to-courts
claim for a prison's interference with access to legal mail).
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C. Exceptions to the Right
There are important limitations on the right of access to the
courts. For instance, states may still regulate the practice of law, al-
though the Court has generally approved restrictions only when they
primarily burden the lawyer and not the client. Such restrictions can
be treated as "economic and professional regulation" and therefore
outside the scope of the access-to-courts doctrine. 259  "[N]arrowly
drawn rules to proscribe solicitation that in fact is misleading, over-
bearing," or deceptive are thus permissible under this framework.260
But this limitation only goes so far. It is not enough to claim merely
that a regulation is intended as a prophylactic protection against un-
scrupulous lawyers, because a regulation cannot burden litigants' First
261Amendment rights without protecting against any apparent harm.
The access-to-courts doctrine may also not apply to frivolous
claims and defenses, since the Court has held that baseless litigation is
262less protected by the First Amendment than meritorious claims. But
it appears that this exception is limited to claims between private par-
ties, since the Court has not applied it to prisoners' section 1983 and
habeas claims despite the widely held perception that such claims are
often frivolous. This practice recognizes the heightened protection
that litigants should and do receive in defending against actions by
the government.
The scope of the right is also limited in the context of hearings
that the Court believes benefit from informality (and, therefore, from
the lack of counsel). In Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survi-263
vors, the Court was unwilling to allow the access-to-courts doctrine to
circumvent the use of the Mathews v. Eldridge164 analysis. The Radia-
259 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978); see also id. at 459
n.16 (discussing the distinction between regulating the commercial activities of lawyers
and restricting access to legal advice).
260 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978); see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-67
(upholding a state regulation that was based on the state's well-founded "perception of
the potential for harm").
261 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-38 (holding that state regulation of attorneys
must be more "precis[e]" when it implicates First Amendment rights).
262 See, e.g., BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (noting that
"baseless litigation" receives less protection than meritorious litigation); Bill Johnson's
Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) ("[S]uits based on insubstantial
claims ... are not within the scope of First Amendment protection. ..
263 473 U.S. 305, 334-35 (1985).
264 See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that the requirements of due process are
determined by an evaluation of "the private interest that will be affected by the official
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tion Survivors plaintiffs were challenging a statutory provision that pre-
vented veterans from paying more than ten dollars to attorneys repre-
265senting them in claims for veterans' benefits. Under the Mathews
analysis, the governmental interest in having informal proceedings
outweighed the claimant's interest in representation, especially be-
cause the benefits had been designed to be adjudicated in a nonad-S• 266
versarial proceeding. Because the Court viewed the core concerns
of the access-to-courts and due process analyses as identical, it found
that there was no additional right to counsel."'
D. Analyzing the McNulty Memorandum Under
the Access-to-Courts Doctrine
The right of access to the courts provides strong protection for the
right to counsel, without the drawbacks of the due process and Sixth
Amendment rights. Indemnification of employees' legal expenses in
the context of government investigations draws together elements
from each of the three main contexts in which the right has previously
been recognized: organizational funding of legal services, the vindica-
tion of fundamental rights in the only available forum, and challenges
to the government's use of its coercive authority. Much like the
NAACP in Button and the union in Trainmen did for their members,
companies today pay for legal services on behalf of their employees to
ensure that they can vindicate important legal rights. Yet the govern-
ment is trying to interfere with access to these legal services.
Unlike in those cases, the employees here are defending rather
than bringing actions in the courts. This makes the right even more
applicable. As the Court recognized in Boddie and the prisoner cases,
access to the courts is especially crucial in this context: The govern-
ment is exercising its coercive authority over employees, and has
nearly complete control over the forum in which litigants can vindi-
cate these rights since it chooses where to charge defendants.118 At
the same time, the employees are seeking to vindicate fundamental
action," "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest," "the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards," and "the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail").
265 473 U.S. at 305, 307.
266 Id. at 331-33.
267 Id. at 334-35.
268 See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 226, at 566 (describing the access-to-courts
doctrine as protecting "claims of right over which the state exercises a monopoly").
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rights-the right to put forth a full defense to the government's
charges and possibly the right to be free from unjustified punishment.
Nor do any of the exceptions to the right impede its application
here. The McNulty Memorandum is not an attempt to protect liti-
gants from the harm of deceptive lawyering, or some other form of
economic regulation. Moreover, Congress has not created a hearing
system that benefits from informality; indeed, the presence of counsel
is the norm during interactions with the DOJ in white-collar cases.269
Finally, this is not a situation where defendants are being accused of
asserting frivolous defenses, and in any event, that exception appears
to apply only to private litigation.
Since the McNulty Memorandum thus appears to infringe on the
right of access to the courts,27 ° it must serve "a compelling state inter-
est"2 71-an interest that is "within the State's constitutional power to
272regulate" and that "subordinates]" the rights of the employees -
and it must be "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment" of
273these rights. This is a difficult standard for the government to meet.
The regulation at issue in Button was invalid because the state could
not show "a serious danger ... of professionally reprehensible" con-
duct that would outweigh the right "to seek vindication of constitu-
tional rights." 74 The Court has even held that companies' right of ac-
cess to the courts is superior to both the government's interest in
enforcing the antitrust laws17 and employees' interest in avoiding re-
276
taliation for legally protected activity.
As discussed above, the DOJ has set forth three general justifica-
tions for the McNulty Memorandum: the promotion of transparency
and fairness in corporate charging decisions, the facilitation of inves-
29 See Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 676 (2005)
("For white collar and corporate crime investigations, the presence of lawyers... is
commonplace.").
270 See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 226, at 569 ("[T]he Supreme Court has
recognized that a theoretical opportunity to petition the courts can be made unavail-
able in practice by government policies that burden ... that right.").
271 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
272 Id. at 438-39.
273 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (reviewing the standards
used in evaluating encroachments on First Amendment rights)).
274 Button, 371 U.S. at 443; see also Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8
(1964) (declaring that the State "failed to show any appreciable public interest" tojus-
tify its actions).
275 Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972).
276 BillJohnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983).
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tigations, and the preservation of investor confidence in the mar-k 277
kets. All of these interests are concededly within the state's power
to regulate, but none of them are superior to the right to counsel.
Indeed, it would be absurd to insist that the interests of the corpora-
tion or the investing public allow the government to infringe on con-
stitutional rights in law enforcement investigations. The goal of facili-
tating investigations seems more credible; the Court has recognized in
other contexts that law enforcement interests can supersede individ-
ual constitutional rights. 27 But this principle has never given law en-
forcement unbridled discretion in its investigations. Moreover, im-
peding access to experienced counsel can even work against the
government's interest, further undercutting a claim that the policy
serves a compelling interest. Defense attorneys who are experienced
in white-collar investigations can actually assist investigations by help-
ing their clients make educated decisions on the benefits of coopera-
tion. They can also help the government reach the right result, rather
than one that results only from pressure on financially strapped em-
ployees.
Finally, even if the interests driving the McNulty Memorandum
were "compelling," the policy is not "closely drawn to avoid unneces-
sary abridgment" of these rights. 279 There is no indication that the
McNulty Memorandum is designed to promote cooperation while en-
suring that constitutional rights are not unnecessarily impeded. DOJ
policy therefore fails the compelling interest test, and unconstitution-
ally infringes the right of access to the courts.
The access-to-courts doctrine can thus provide much better pro-
tection for the right to counsel than due process and the Sixth
Amendment. Unlike due process, it does not require a deprivation of
liberty or property, and unlike the Sixth Amendment, it does not re-
quire criminal charges. Under this framework, the government can-
not evade constitutional constraints by interfering with an employee's
access to counsel during an investigation and then never indicting
that employee. Moreover, if the SEC were to adopt a policy similar to280
the DOJ's (as some commentators fear ), it would be similarly con-
strained. Perhaps the biggest advantage of this framework is that it
lessens the individual's burden of proof. Rather than being required
277 See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
278 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 271-273 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
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to demonstrate that she received ineffective assistance of counsel or
that her choice of counsel was actually constrained by the govern-
ment's actions, an employee can make the somewhat easier claim that
government action interfered with her access to legal advice. This
could help bolster a claim that even when a company restricted in-
demnification "voluntarily"-to seek credit more informally, or to
avoid punishment under the "exception" of the McNulty Memoran-
281dum -government action had unconstitutionally impeded access to
counsel. This doctrine therefore flexibly protects against government
restrictions on indemnification without the substantial emphasis on
specific circumstances imposed by other constitutional doctrines.
IV. AN EFFECTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY
When analyzed under the access-to-courts doctrine, it becomes
clear that DOJ policy requires further revision. This change should
have two basic elements. In order to protect individuals' access to le-
gal advice, the policy should prevent the government from giving
companies or employees any credit for limitations on indemnification
of attorneys' fees. At the same time, it should prevent the indemnifi-
cation of penalty and disgorgement payments, in order to preserve
the deterrent and punitive effects of these sanctions. The SEC's pol-
icy,182 which successfully balances constraints on indemnification with
the preservation of access to counsel, could serve as a useful model for
the DOJ in this effort. By making these revisions, the DOJ could still
accomplish its goal of encouraging cooperation, but without infring-
ing defendants' constitutional rights, impeding legal conduct by cor-
porate employees, or allowing defendants to escape the force of sanc-
tions they accept in settlement.
A. A Blanket Prohibition
Most importantly, the policy must be constitutional. It must re-
spect the right to counsel embodied in the access-to-courts doctrine
and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Employees should be free to
use the most competent counsel they or their willing employer can
pay for, throughout the investigation and litigation. Moreover, em-
ployees should not face the possibility that their employer will with-
draw financial support because of government intervention, so nei-
281 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
22 See supra Part I.C.2.
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ther prosecutors nor companies should be able to bargain away in-
demnification of attorneys' fees during settlement negotiations.
To accomplish this, the policy must universally prohibit prosecu-
tors from considering whether a company is paying its employees' le-
gal expenses when making prosecutorial decisions. Although it is
tempting to allow the DOJ to penalize at least those companies using
indemnification as a tool to discourage their employees from cooper-
ating with the government, such a solution would be too vulnerable to
abuse.2 3 Indeed, companies might feel pressured, as they do today, s4
to restrict indemnification in order to avoid any appearance that they
are using it improperly. Nor is such an exception even necessary; the
DOJ has plenty of other tools at its disposal to deal with this type of
conduct.2 8 5 A blanket prohibition, on the other hand, will ensure that
the policy is facially constitutional and that the DOJ continues to ap-
ply it in a constitutional manner.
This prohibition will also promote two other subconstitutional but
still critical sets of values: fairness in governmental action and the
benefits of corporate indemnification. Employees can incur substan-
tial attorneys' fees before an employee's guilt is even assessed by the
agency. The DOJ and SEC commonly target individuals for investiga-
tion without sufficient evidence to bring a claim against them. This
practice is a routine part of law enforcement investigations, but it can
have severe repercussions for individuals. Long before charges are
filed-assuming they ever are-employees' careers can be disrupted
and their legal bills can be immense. These investigations, even in
their earliest stages, can be hugely complex; discovery alone can be
incredibly resource intensive. Since few employees have the resources
to adequately confront such litigation, the quality of legal representa-
tion suffers in the absence of indemnification. s6 Employees are also
283 Indeed, the excesses under the Thompson Memorandum arguably arose not
from the Memorandum itself as much as from prosecutors' realization that it gave
them a "tactical advantage" in their investigations. Interview with Eric Holder, supra
note 43.
214 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (citing commentators who argue
that without an outright ban, companies will still attempt to restrict indemnification to
satisfy the DOJ's perceived demands).
285 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000) (authorizing fines and penalties for witness
tampering, harassment, intimidation, and obstruction of federal proceedings).
286 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After
Booker, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 721, 738 (2005) (describing the considerable impact
that the skill and experience of a white-collar defendant's lawyer can have on her suc-
cess in negotiations with the government); cf Rudovsky, supra note 192, at 1969
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likely to feel pressure to accede to the government's demands merely
because of a lack of resources. In the long run, this practice can dis-
courage even law-abiding individuals from serving in corporate posi-
tions that are likely to be the subject of government investigations,
such as senior management and financial reporting positions. It can
also increase the likelihood that prosecutorial resources will be tar-
geted at the wrong individuals. These consequences should concern
the government, even agencies with prosecutorial functions.
Finally, it would be in the DOJ's interest to revise its policy. At
least one judge has determined that the appropriate response to ap-
plications of DOJ policy is the dismissal of the DOJ's indictments.287
Members of Congress have shown their willingness to constrain prose-
cutorial action through legislation. 2"' As imperfect as these efforts
may be, they have the potential to constrain prosecutorial discre-
tion. Presumably, the DOJ would prefer to protect its prosecutors'
prerogatives and its flexibility in assessing cooperation in future cases.
Moreover, lifting restrictions on the indemnification of attorneys' fees
would likely facilitate investigations by enabling defendants to hire at-
torneys experienced with the DOJ's practices who thus know when to
advise their clients that cooperation is in their best interest, and who
can help the DOJ to achieve more accurate results in its investigations.
B. Postjudgment Restrictions
On the other hand, the DOJ should follow the SEC's lead and re-
strict the indemnification of restitution and fines, much as the SEC
policy restricts the indemnification of penalties (and, to a lesser ex-
tent, disgorgement).290 By reimbursing such payments, companies are
allowing employees to circumvent statutory sanctions for wrongdoing.
("Some criminal charges are so complex that specialized and well paid advocates are
essential to a fair defense.").
287 United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
298 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
289 For criticisms of the approach used by the Stein court, see Part II. The Attor-
ney-Client Privilege Protection Act has been criticized for "tell[ing] the executive
branch that it may not consider something in the exercise of its discretion" and "inad-
visably preventting] the state from considering anything having to do with employer
policies on regulatory interviews." Buell, supra note 33, at 1648.
20 It would also be appropriate for Congress to expand the statutory ban on in-
demnification of fines from statutes like the FCPA. See supra note 88 and accompany-
ing text. This would have the advantage of imposing these restrictions even outside of
the settlement context, where the government has less power to shape sanctions.
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Indemnification of fines guts their punitive and deterrent functions.2
Indemnification of restitution allows employees to profit from illegal
activity292 at the expense of company shareholders. By preventing
indemnification of these payments, on the other hand, the DOJ could
ensure that crime is less profitable, wrongdoers are punished, and
others are deterred from similar conduct.2 4 Such a policy may even
promote cooperation during the government's investigation, 295 just as
the DOJ hopes to do with the McNulty Memorandum.
Moreover, restrictions on the indemnification of financial sanc-
tions, unlike restrictions on the indemnification of attorneys' fees, do
not violate constitutional rights. Naturally, the rights to counsel and
access to the courts are not implicated by the imposition of financial
sanctions. Nor is there a colorable due process claim here, since cor-
porate employees certainly have "notice" that illegal actions can be in-
vestigated and prosecuted, and their right to a hearing (assisted by
counsel) would not be impeded. Although large fines can run afoul
of the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause,296 their constitu-
21 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors'Fiduciary
Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REv. 393, 433-34 (2005) ("[F]inancial sanc-
tions... are a powerful source of deterrence because they make the costs of illegal be-
havior outweigh the benefits.").
292 See Cutler, supra note 97; Donaldson, supra note 95.
23 Even if an insurer then reimburses the company for its expenses, the insurer's
costs are passed on to shareholders in the long run through insurance premiums. See
Griffith, supra note 40, at 1182 (noting that bad corporate governance leads to insur-
ance payouts and, ultimately, higher D&O insurance premiums, an expense that is
"borne by the shareholders").
294 There are potential downsides to such an approach. The threat of paying large
disgorgement awards could discourage corporate service by individuals who fear being
innocently caught up in a government investigation. State lawmakers might resent the
added intrusions of the federal government into the indemnification arena, which has
traditionally been considered the province of the states. Perhaps most importantly,
mandating out-of-pocket payment of disgorgement years after an illegal act can simply
impede the collection of disgorgement and restitution awards-indemnification may
actually help to ensure that disgorgement awards are paid, and thus disbursed to
shareholders or other victims of crime. See, e.g., Ross Todd, Three Cents on the Dollar,
LiG. 2007, Fall 2007, at 68, 68, 69 (supp. to AM. LAW., Nov. 2007) (noting that al-
though "[j]udges have handed down some staggering restitution orders," "the balance
of uncollected fines and restitution continues to grow").
25 See Wallace P. Mullin & Christopher M. Snyder, Targeting Employees for Cor-
porate Crime and Forbidding Their Indemnification 5 (Apr. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=558341 (arguing that a bar on in-
demnification of financial sanctions will encourage cooperation with government in-
vestigations).
296 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed .... ").
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tionality under that amendment is a function of the actual fine im-
posed, not of who pays it.297
Similarly, constraints on the indemnification of financial sanctions
do not implicate the fairness concerns involved in the context of at-
torneys' fees. When the government causes the indemnification of at-
torneys' fees to be terminated during an investigation, it acts before
even prosecutors have determined that the employee has acted ille-
gally. When the government acts during litigation, it does so before a
court has made that determination. But if the government constrains
only the indemnification of financial sanctions, it merely enforces a
sanction approved by a court or agreed to in settlement by an em-
ployee.
. • • 298
Finally, the typical justifications for indemnification do not ap-
ply here with the same force. Indemnification is often justified as en-
couraging qualified employees to serve in important corporate posi-
tions and to act in the corporation's best interest while in those
positions. But when the government and a court have determined
that an individual has acted illegally, these justifications are no longer
valid.299 Although we want qualified people to be officers and direc-
tors, we do not want wrongdoers in those positions. And since illegal
action is often contrary to the corporation's long-term interest (espe-
cially when it is discovered by the government), we do not want to
protect it through indemnification.
To be fully effective, restrictions on indemnification of penalties
must be enforced on both companies and employees, as they are by
the SEC. Settlement agreements between companies and the gov-
ernment should prohibit companies from indemnifying their employ-
ees for any financial sanctions assessed against them. Similarly, set-
tlements between employees and the government should uniformly
forbid employees from seeking indemnification for financial sanc-
tions. Similar treatment of companies and employees would help to
297 See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment's applicability turns on whether the purpose of a sanction is puni-
tive or remedial); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 264 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply "when the gov-
ernment neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the
damages awarded").
. See supra Part I.B. 1.
29 See Stifel Fin. Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 561 (Del. 2002) (describing the
"express purpose of" Delaware's indemnification provisions as the "protect[ion] [of]
directors from personal liability for corporate expenses" (emphasis added)).
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ensure that the public receives an acceptable bargain in exchange for
the settlement.
CONCLUSION
It is unsettling when government policy constrains access to coun-
sel, and the legal community has understandably leapt to the defense
of the right to counsel in reaction to the Thompson and McNulty
Memoranda. Unfortunately, the traditional roots of the right to
counsel do not aid this effort as much as the critics of DOJ policy
hope. Although in certain contexts, the McNulty Memorandum could
be held unconstitutional under procedural due process and the Sixth
Amendment, these provisions provide only imperfect protection for
defendants. Substantive due process fares even worse. The access-to-
courts doctrine, on the other hand, is an effective device for revealing
the unconstitutionality of the McNulty Memorandum's burden on ac-
cess to counsel. Viewed in this light, the need for revisions to DOJ
policy becomes more clear.
Fortunately, the DOJ took a step in the right direction when it re-
placed the Thompson Memorandum with the McNulty Memoran-
dum. But there is more work to be done, starting with a blanket pro-
hibition on considering the indemnification of attorneys' fees in
charging decisions. At the same time, the DOJ should follow the
SEC's lead by restricting the indemnification of restitution and fines.
Such a policy would recognize the appropriate role for governmental
restrictions on indemnification in promoting the effectiveness of fi-
nancial sanctions, without going too far by impeding individuals' ac-
cess to counsel.
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